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We use surveys, laboratory experiments and administrative labor-market data to study how 
heterogeneity in the perceived immorality of work and in workers’ aversion to acting 
immorally interact to impact labor market outcomes. Specifically, we investigate whether 
those individuals least concerned with acting morally select into jobs generally perceived as 
immoral and whether the aversion among many individuals to performing such acts 
contributes to immorality wage premiums, a form of compensating differential. We show that 
immoral work is associated with higher wages, both using correlational evidence from 
administrative labor-market data and causal evidence from a laboratory experiment. We also 
measure individuals’ aversion to performing immoral acts and show that those who find 
immoral behavior least aversive are more likely to be employed in immoral work in the lab 
and have a relative preference for work perceived as immoral outside the laboratory. We note 
that sorting by “immoral” types into jobs that can cause harm may be detrimental for society. 
Our study highlights the value of employing complementary research methods.  
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1. Introduction 
Immoral workplace behavior has the potential to cause significant social harm. For 
example, financial industry scandals involving the intentional sale of toxic assets to 
unsuspecting clients (US Department of Justice, 2016) and the aiding of tax evasion (Hill, 
2012) create significant burdens for public funds and erode trust in the financial sector. 
Tobacco companies have long been accused of engaging in misleading marketing regarding 
smoking’s harmful effects (Heath, 2016) and intentionally targeting underage smokers (Bates 
and Rowell, 1998). Aggressive marketing of opioids by pharmaceutical firms contributed to a 
serious public health crisis (Okie, 2010; Case and Deaton, 2015). In cases like these, as well 
as in less extreme examples, corporate activities that many regard as “immoral” or 
“unethical”—but are nevertheless profitable—may have serious negative impacts on social 
welfare.  
Rather than representing isolated incidents, there exists a widespread impression that 
some jobs—e.g., marketing tobacco products, manufacturing weapons—likely involve 
inherently immoral acts. Conventional wisdom further posits that such jobs 
disproportionately attract those individuals who experience the least displeasure from acting 
immorally and that workers performing these kinds of jobs receive high wages, a form of 
compensating differential for unethical conduct.1 Thus, “immoral” work shares features with 
other aspects of employment that people may find heterogeneously aversive, such as risk of 
physical harm (Rosen, 1986), and implies potentially higher labor costs for firms in industries 
tainted with the perception of immorality.2  
However, despite the intuitive appeal of such relationships, little empirical evidence 
links heterogeneity in the willingness to perform work generally perceived as immoral to 
resulting differential labor market outcomes; we review this and related work in the next 
section. Moreover, there are many reasons to believe that concerns for moral conduct may be 
mitigated in competitive markets (Levitt and List, 2008; Lazear, Malmendier and Weber, 
2013), where wages are set by the preferences of the marginal worker and where repeatedly 
																																								 																				
1 This view dates back to Adam Smith (1776;	Book I; Ch. X), who wrote that, “The exorbitant rewards of 
players, opera-singers, opera-dancers, etc., are founded upon [..] the discredit of employing them in this manner. 
[..] Should the public opinion or prejudice ever alter with regard to such occupations, their pecuniary 
recompense would quickly diminish. More people would apply to them, and the competition would quickly 
reduce the price of their labour.” At the time, such professions were seen as morally tainted; Smith equated them 
with “a sort of public prostitution.”  
2 This perception is reflected in press accounts and corporate statements. For example, following the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal, Facebook struggled to attract top talent (CNBC, 2019). Tobacco companies deem difficulties 
in recruitment arising from their image as sufficiently important to warrant disclosure to regulators and 
shareholders (British American Tobacco, 2015, p. 37; Philip Morris International Inc., 2015, p. 14).	
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forgoing profitable job opportunities may erode workers’ aversion to performing immoral 
acts. On the other hand, moral concerns might be particularly relevant in labor markets, as job 
choices are typically visible to others and may significantly impact workers’ social image. 
In this paper, we provide novel evidence testing the above relationships between the 
perceived immorality of work, workers’ heterogeneous concerns for acting morally and 
outcomes in labor markets. We employ a combination of surveys, laboratory experiments and 
administrative labor market data, in which we obtain measures of individuals’ concerns for 
morality and relate these to variation in the morality of work. The administrative data 
provides the clearest evidence of the economic relevance of these relationships, but in these 
data “immoral” industries might differ in many unobservable aspects from other industries, 
making it difficult to establish a causal relationship from the immorality of work to labor 
market outcomes. The control provided by laboratory experiments allows us to observe the 
kinds of outcomes that arise as the nature of work changes only in the extent to which it is 
immoral. We additionally use evidence from surveys to obtain insights into relationships 
between individuals’ concerns for morality and their willingness to work in different real-
world firms and industries. Thus, our paper highlights the value of employing complementary 
research methods to address complex economic phenomena.  
Our work is focused on two specific hypotheses that arise from a simple theoretical 
analysis of how individuals’ heterogeneous aversion to performing immoral work may 
interact with jobs that vary in the immorality of the work they require. The two hypotheses 
reflect the perceptions that we note above: first, that more immoral work yields higher 
wages—as long as workers care enough about moral conduct—and, second, that immoral 
work attracts those workers least concerned with acting morally.  
Our results provide support for these two hypotheses, both in and out of the 
laboratory. Table 1 provides an overview of our main findings.  
First, we show that immoral work commands a wage premium over comparable work 
not perceived as immoral. We show this in Section 4, using administrative labor market data, 
where we find that industries generally perceived as immoral yield higher wages, controlling 
for observable worker and industry characteristics. Moreover, in our laboratory labor 
markets—which vary by treatment only whether being employed requires doing something 
immoral—we observe a causal relationship indicating that wages are persistently higher for 
immoral work (Section 5). This wage premium is large and does not decrease with market 
experience, reflecting a stable aversion to immoral work.  
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Second, we provide evidence of sorting by immoral types into immoral work, both in 
the laboratory and in the field. We obtain two measures of individuals’ aversion to acting 
immorally, from a behavioral task and from a survey conducted several days apart, and find 
that the measures are correlated. These two measures of immorality predict individual labor 
market outcomes: in our laboratory labor markets (Section 5), immoral types are employed 
more frequently, but only when work involves doing something immoral. In our survey data 
(Section 6), immoral types report a significantly greater willingness to work in firms and 
industries that are generally perceived by others as immoral.3  
Table 1. Overview of our evidence on wage premiums and sorting 
 Laboratory labor market Labor markets outside the laboratory 
Immorality 
premium 
Causal evidence for a wage 
premium for immoral work 
(Section 5; Figure 5) 
Correlation between perceived industry 
immorality and wages in the Swiss labor 
market (Section 4; Figure 1, Table 2) 
Sorting 
Immoral types are more 
likely to be hired, but only for 
immoral work  
(Section 5; Figure 6, Table 5) 
Immoral types state a greater willingness 
to work in firms and industries perceived 
by others as immoral  
(Section 6; Figure 9, Table 7) 
 
Our findings have important policy implications, which we discuss further in the 
Conclusion. For example, our evidence of sorting in laboratory and non-laboratory labor 
markets suggests that industries with great potential for social harm—e.g., weapons 
manufacturing—may attract those individuals least concerned with those impacts. Moreover, 
this sorting process may also mean that perceptions that a firm or industry involves immoral 
behavior may be self-reinforcing if they lead to a workforce mainly comprising those 
individuals least concerned with acting morally. Thus, even in industries that may not be 
inherently immoral, like financial services, the perception that they involve immorality may 
be sufficient to tilt the labor force toward individuals more likely to commit immoral acts. 
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss how this 
paper relates and contributes to previous literature. Section 3 describes a simple theoretical 
framework that we use to develop hypotheses. In Section 4, we use Swiss labor market data 
to investigate the relationship between the perceived immorality of work and wages. Section 
																																								 																				
3 While these job choices are hypothetical, Wiswall and Zafar (2018) provide evidence that stated labor market 
preferences predict subsequent employment. 
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5 presents the design and results of our laboratory experiment, while Section 6 describes our 
survey study. Section 7 concludes by discussing implications of our findings for policy. 
2. Related Literature  
The closest prior evidence supporting the relationships we investigate comes from studies 
documenting positive correlations between the perceived immorality of work and the wages 
obtained by workers in those “immoral” firms or industries (Frank, 1996; Moffatt and Peters, 
2004; Arunachalam and Shah, 2008; Edlund, Engelberg and Parsons, 2009). This is similar to 
the correlational evidence we provide in Section 4, but prior evidence focuses on more 
limited samples. For example, Frank (1996) used data from a Cornell University employment 
survey that included graduates’ occupations, employers and reported salaries.4 He then asked 
students in a business ethics class to rate the “social responsibility” of the most common 
occupations and employers of Cornell graduates. A regression controlling for other 
observable characteristics—such as a student’s major, grades and gender—reveals a premium 
for occupations and employers that are rated as less socially responsible. 
Frank’s evidence is consistent with the notion that concerns for avoiding immoral 
work produce differential wages across occupations and industries. However, there remain 
important gaps in documenting that the relationships observed by Frank are really the result 
of sorting, heterogeneous moral preferences and compensating differentials. Most obviously, 
correlational evidence between wages and the perceived immorality of work might result 
from other unobserved worker and job characteristics. For instance, Moffatt and Peters 
(2004) document a wage premium for prostitution, which they attribute to a compensating 
differential (see, also, Arunachalam and Shah, 2008; Edlund, Engelberg and Parsons, 2009); 
but it is unclear whether the compensation is for the perceived immorality or for other 
aversive aspects of the job (Edlund and Korn, 2002; Gertler, Shah and Bertozzi, 2005).5 
Moreover, such studies fail to measure a critical element—the identification of workers’ 
heterogeneous concerns for morality—as a key driver of the relationship.6  
																																								 																				
4 Note that these wages may not correspond to (average) industry wages because his sample is very selective. 
Unlike Frank (1996), we use a sample that is representative of the national workforce in Switzerland. 
5 Related work in finance (e.g., Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant, 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Colonnello, 
Curatola and Gioffré, 2019) demonstrates that investing in firms that engage in immoral activities (“sin stocks”) 
yields higher returns. However, other industry and firm characteristics, such as litigation risk, may also differ 
between these types of investments (Blitz and Fabozzi, 2017). 
6 While there is some correlational evidence that people in some industries exhibit lower concerns for morality 
(Carter and Irons, 1991; Sjöberg and Engelberg, 2009), these studies do not document that these moral concerns 
drive differential selection into different kinds of work rather than the relationship being perhaps the other way 
around (Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 1993; Cohn, Fehr and Maréchal, 2014; Ashraf and Bandiera, 2017). 
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Our work also relates to the broader literature on compensating differentials. A 
substantial number of studies investigate whether nonprofit employees earn less than for-
profit employees (e.g., Leete, 2001; Mocan and Tekin, 2003; Ruhm and Borkoski, 2003; 
Benedict, McClough and McClough, 2006; Jones, 2015). These studies yield mixed 
correlational evidence, likely due to methodological challenges in estimating compensating 
wage differentials using observational data (see the discussion in Mas and Pallais, 2017). 
Recent papers on compensating differentials instead rely on experimental methods and/or 
stated preferences (Eriksson and Kristensen, 2014; Pörtner, Hassairi and Toomim, 2015; 
Carpenter, Matthews and Robbett, 2017; Mas and Pallais, 2017; Maestas et al., 2018; 
Wiswall and Zafar, 2018). We differ from this work in that we explore the immorality of 
work and the aversion to acting immorally as the driving sources of heterogeneity and we 
present causal evidence on compensating wage differentials in the domain of morality. 
There is also related evidence on sorting by pro-social “mission-oriented” types into 
the public sector (Carpenter and Myers, 2010; Gregg, et al., 2011; Buurman, et al., 2012; Dur 
and Zoutenbier, 2014; Fisman et al, 2015; Hanna and Wang, 2017; Ashraf, et al., 2019;  
Friebel, Kosfeld and Thielmann, 2019). However, none of this work tests how differential 
sorting by heterogeneous types impacts labor market outcomes such as wages. Moreover, our 
focus on sorting into immoral work can have distinct policy implications. For example, 
sorting by immoral types into jobs where they can cause social harm may often exacerbate 
the negative social impacts of such work. That is, from society’s perspective we may want 
those people most inclined to act morally working in industries with the greatest potential for 
producing social harm, but our results suggest the opposite will occur. Conversely, sorting by 
pro-socially oriented types into the public sector is likely to increase the positive social 
impacts of their work.7 
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on moral behavior in markets (e.g., Falk 
and Szech, 2013; Bartling, Weber and Yao, 2015; Kirchler, Huber, Stefan and Sutter, 2016). 
Levitt and List (2007, 2008) question whether social preferences matter in markets, due to 
factors including high stakes, market competition and experience. Our estimates from the 
administrative labor market data indicate a substantial wage premium for immoral work, 
suggesting that many workers are willing to forgo financial gains to not work in immoral 
																																								 																				
7 Our study also relates to research on effort and sorting by mission-oriented types (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; 
Prendergast, 2007; Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008; Ariely, Bracha and Meier, 2009; Dal Bó, Finan and Rossi, 2013; 
Fehrler and Kosfeld, 2014; Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2015; Carpenter and Gong, 2016; Cassar and Meier, 2018; 
Cassar, 2019; Deseranno, 2019; Dur and van Lent, 2019), though this line of research typically focuses on 
worker motivation and effort within firms and not on worker morality and labor demand in competitive labor 
markets.  
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industries. Our survey data indicates that concerns for moral conduct predict sorting into 
industries. Finally, in the laboratory labor market, we find that neither the wage premium nor 
sorting decrease with market experience. These findings suggest that moral preferences 
matter for labor markets, and that they can impact both market wages and individual market 
outcomes. 
3. Theoretical framework 
Our study is guided by hypotheses obtained from a simple model of labor markets 
with varying degrees of perceived job immorality and workers’ heterogeneous concern for 
avoiding immoral behavior.8 We present the detailed model and analysis in Appendix D; in 
this section, we focus only on the model’s key predictions. 
We examine a labor market for a job, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, which might involve doing immoral 
work. The immorality of 𝑗 is measured by a function 𝐼: 𝐽 → [0,∞), where 𝐼(𝑗!) > 𝐼(𝑗) means 
that job 𝑗′ is more immoral than job 𝑗. Firms decide whether to hire a worker to do 𝑗 at the 
market wage, w, and workers decide whether to accept work 𝑗 for the market wage. Workers 
differ in degree to which they are concerned with acting morally, 𝜃! ≥ 0. A worker of type 𝜃! 
accepts job 𝑗 if the utility from doing so is higher than that of an outside option, or 
𝑢!
!""#$% 𝑗,𝑤 = 𝑤 − 𝑐 − 𝜃! ∗ 𝐼(𝑗) ≥ 𝑢, 
where 𝑐 ≥ 0 is the worker’s cost of effort and 𝑢 ≥ 0 is the workers’ reservation utility.  
Our first two results derive the primary hypotheses that we test across our analysis. 
The first result (Proposition 1) shows that there is an immorality premium for immoral jobs: 
an increase in the immorality of a job, 𝐼(𝑗), decreases labor supply and therefore increases the 
equilibrium wage. However, this wage premium will be insignificant if workers do not 
sufficiently care about morality. Our second main result (Proposition 2) states that those 
individuals least concerned with avoiding immoral work—i.e., those with low 𝜃!—sort into 
accepting immoral jobs, while those more concerned with morality refuse to do the job for 
the equilibrium wage. That is, wage premiums arise precisely because those who find 
immoral work most distasteful opt out of such jobs, which also has implications for the 
resulting composition of the workforce in industries and firms performing immoral work. 
This important relationship has, to our knowledge, not been previously empirically tested. 
																																								 																				
8 Our framework is a simplification of the theoretical literature on compensating wage differentials (see, e.g., 
Rosen, 1986). We do not seek to expand this literature, but rather to apply it to a context in which the relevant 
job dimension is immorality. 
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Our next two results are less central, but nevertheless provide useful testable insights 
into outcomes in labor markets for immoral work. First, we show that that the most immoral 
types profit from an increase in the immorality of work (Proposition 3). Second, more 
widespread concern for moral behavior—i.e., more people caring about avoiding immoral 
work—can have positive externalities for the most immoral types (Proposition 4). That is, if 
the distribution of types shifts toward greater concern for morality (higher 𝜃!), then the 
supply at any given wage decreases, increasing the equilibrium wage and the utility of those 
least concerned with morality.  
4. Evidence of an immorality premium in the Swiss labor market  
Our analysis first explores whether individuals working in industries generally 
perceived as immoral obtain wage premiums. We use data from the Swiss Labor Force 
Survey (SLSF), a representative sample of Swiss workers compiled by the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office, to study the relationship between the perceived immorality of work and the 
portion of wages that cannot be explained by observable worker and industry characteristics. 
We initially identified industries that we jointly perceived as involving work activities 
likely to be widely seen as immoral; we did so before looking at any data from these 
industries, including wages.9 This yielded six “immoral” industries: gambling and betting 
activities, monetary intermediations, credit granting, manufacture of tobacco products, 
wholesale of tobacco products and manufacture of weapons and ammunition. We then chose 
comparison industries from within the same industrial branch with similar distributions of 
education levels, as well as nine additional industries representing large shares of 
employment in Switzerland.10 We did not look at wages when selecting any of these 
industries. 
																																								 																				
9 Specifically, we started with the complete list of industries listed in the SLFS. Each of the authors went 
through the list and indicated any industries that he or she believed was widely perceived to have a significant 
immoral component. We selected those industries for which all three authors agreed. We proceed this way, 
rather than using the entire set of Swiss industries, to keep the number of questions we ask in subsequent 
surveys manageable. A natural concern is that choosing the sample of industries ourselves possibly 
(unconsciously) biases the sample toward those likely to confirm our hypothesis. In Appendix B we provide 
evidence for an immorality premium that does not rely on our sample of industries. First, we show that 
“immoral industries” (based on survey respondent’s ratings) are also estimated to pay a wage premium when we 
add all other industries as control industries. Second, we replicate the entire analysis with another set of 
industries selected by research assistants who were not familiar with the research question. We thank Uri 
Gneezy for suggesting this approach. 
10 We chose five comparison industries: non-life insurance (for monetary intermediations; credit granting), 
organization and operation of sport facilities (for gambling and betting activities), processing of tea and coffee 
(for manufacture of tobacco products), manufacture of electronic components (for manufacture of weapons and 
ammunitions), wholesale of perfume and cosmetics (for wholesale of tobacco products). 
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We next obtained independent ratings of the perceived (im)morality of the selected 
industries. We asked a sample of 177 students on the campus of the University of Zurich and 
the Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) to rate each industry on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from “very moral” to “very immoral,” re-scaled the responses to lie on the -1 to 1 
interval and averaged the responses. (These survey data were collected as part of our survey 
studies, which we describe in more detail in Section 5.) We interpret this variable as a 
measure of the perceived immorality of working in industry 𝑗, or 𝐼(𝑗), a key component of 
our theoretical analysis. The mean ratings for each industry are shown on the horizontal axis 
of Figure 1. They confirm that our initial judgments with respect to the perceived immorality 
of certain industries are shared by the survey respondents.  
  Figure 1: Correlation between wages and perceived industry immorality 
 
Source: Weighted data from the SLFS, years 2010-2016 (wage) and our own survey (perceived industry 
immorality). Notes: Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means 
very immoral. Real gross hourly wage in 2010 CHF. N = 32,638.  
The vertical axis of Figure 1 plots the mean real gross hourly wage (in 2010 Swiss 
Francs) in each industry. These data are the reported hourly wages of employees surveyed in 
the SLFS. We use data from the 2010 to 2016 waves. The strong positive relationship 
supports the hypothesis that work in less moral industries yields a wage premium.  This result 
is not due to our choice of the industry sample—Figure B1 in the Appendix shows similar 
correlations in another set of industries independently selected by research assistants unaware 
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Table 2: Relationship between wages and perceived industry immorality 
Dependent variable: ln of real gross hourly wage (in 2010 CHF) 
 (1) (2) (3) 




































































N 32,638 32,638 32,638 
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.379 0.397 
Year FE No No Yes 
Region FE No No Yes 
Source: Weighed data from the SLFS, years 2010-2016 (wage and demographics), STATENT, years 2011-2016 
(industry size, industry sales), Value Added Tax Statistics, years 2010-2016 (industry sales) and our own survey 
(perceived industry immorality).  
Notes: Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very 
immoral. Control variables: Male in {0, 1}, Married in {0, 1}, Education high: higher vocational education and 
training or university/college, Education middle: apprenticeship, full-time vocational school, matura or 
pedagogical training, Education low (reference category): compulsory schooling or pre-vocational education, 
Swiss in {0, 1}, Experience = number of years in the firm, Full-time equivalent = (working hours /42), set to 1 
for working hours >= 42, managerial duties in {0, 1}, Industry size = number employees in this industry / 1000 
(2010 data is not available, we substitute it with 2011 data), Industry sales = Industry sales/number employees 
in this industry. Model (3) controls for company region fixed effects (26 Swiss cantons) and year fixed effects 
(2010-2016). Standard errors clustered at the industry level, t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; 
*** p < 0.01. 
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Of course, the relationship in Figure 1 ignores the potential role of individual worker 
characteristics, which may vary across industries, and other characteristics of the industries 
that may account for the wage gaps. To partially address this concern, Table 2 reports 
regressions of the hourly wage reported by individuals in different industries on the perceived 
immorality of each industry, along with several additional control variables. Model 1 displays 
the results of a simple regression of the natural logarithm of real gross hourly wages on the 
perceived industry’s immorality, supporting the positive relationship in Figure 1. Model 2 
adds observable worker and industry characteristics, while Model 3 additionally includes 
indicator variables for each year and indicator variables for the region where the employer is 
located.11 The immorality premium remains large and statistically significant: according to 
Model 3, individuals working in an industry as immoral as manufacture of tobacco products 
(i.e., Perceived immorality = 0.47) have (geometric) mean hourly earnings approximately 35 
percent higher than people working in a neutral industry (i.e., Perceived immorality = 0).12 
Appendix Table B1 shows a statistically significant wage premium using alternative 
approaches for classifying immoral industries, including firms selected independently by 
research assistants. 
The above analysis is consistent with workers’ concern with the perceived immorality 
of work requiring compensation. However, the correlational aspect of the relationship leaves 
open the possibility that additional unobserved industry characteristics may explain the 
relationship in Figure 1. Moreover, the analysis does not tell us whether the workers 
employed in these industries differ in their concerns for morality. In the following two 
sections, we explore the model’s predictions more carefully—controlling for unobservable 
aspects of work and making a clearer connection to subjects’ heterogeneous concerns for 
morality. 
5. Sorting and wage premiums in a laboratory labor market 
Our experimental study investigates the preferences and behavior of subjects in the 
role of workers participating in a labor market. These subjects complete an online 
questionnaire, and then participate in a laboratory experiment approximately one week later. 
																																								 																				
11 Since the number of clusters is relatively small, we also computed significance levels using the wild bootstrap 
(Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008) with 400 replications; p-values for industry immorality are 0.070 for 
Model 1, 0.000 for Model 2, and 0.005 for Model 3. Note also that numbers of observations differ substantially 
between industries. If we weight observations by industry size (instead of using survey weights), estimates for 
perceived immorality are smaller (Model 1: 0.489, Model 2: 0.349, Model 3: 0.344), but still significant (t=3.88, 
3.10, and 4.03, respectively). Appendix Table A1 provides summary statistics of all variables. 
12 We obtain this number by doing the following calculation: e0.638*0.47 – 1  ≈ 0.350.  
	 11	
The questionnaire measures subjects’ concern for morality using survey instruments, as well 
as their preferences regarding future employment possibilities. We discuss the online 
questionnaire in detail in Section 6, where we also report the analysis of the resulting data. In 
this section, we focus on the design and results of the laboratory experiment.  
In the laboratory sessions, subjects perform two choice tasks. First, we elicit a 
measure of concern for morality (corresponding to 𝜃) using an incentivized behavioral task, 
adapted from Gneezy, Rockenbach and Serra-Garcia (2013), that creates a tradeoff between 
personal monetary gain and moral conduct. We use this measure to investigate whether 
participants with low concern for morality sort into immoral work. Second, subjects 
participate in a laboratory labor market for 15 periods, in which they submit reservation 
wages for performing a task. Labor demand is simulated according to a fixed demand 
schedule; that is, wage offers are made by computerized employers.  
The key feature of our laboratory experiment is that we exogenously vary only the 
immorality of work—holding constant all other job characteristics, including the specific 
actions subjects take when employed—to investigate the causal impact on labor market 
outcomes. We attempt to design an “immoral” act that is unambiguously harmful and for 
which there is likely widespread agreement regarding its immorality. We opt for an act akin 
to giving bad financial advice to a non-profit organization, like UNICEF, thereby harming the 
non-profit’s financial standing and thus harming the organization’s employees and its ability 
to help aid recipients. Providing harmful information and misleading customers is a realistic 
feature of many existing jobs perceived as immoral.  
We operationalize this kind of scenario in our experiment by informing subjects that 
each session is endowed with an initial donation to a UNICEF fund that provides malaria 
treatments for children (the aid recipients).13 However, the actual final donation for a session 
is influenced by the behavior of participants in the session. Specifically, subjects in our 
experiment are hired to provide written advice to a “client” (a subject who participates in a 
subsequent survey and serves a role analogous to the non-profit’s employee). We vary, by 
treatment, whether workers are assigned to a market with neutral jobs that involve honest 
advice that has little impact on the client and the UNICEF fund or to a market with immoral 
																																								 																				
13 To strengthen the moral context, these initial donations are linked to a donation generated by a third party’s 
blood donation. Prior to the laboratory session, we approached individuals who had just donated blood as part of 
a donation campaign. We asked them whether they would agree that the University of Zurich potentially make a 
donation to UNICEF as a complement to their blood donation. Most donors we approached agreed. We did not 
otherwise obtain any information or choices from these donors. 
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jobs that involve dishonest advice that hurts the client and UNICEF. A worker’s choice of 
whether to accept work is visible to other workers in the labor market.14 
After the laboratory sessions, we recruited a separate sample of individuals at public 
locations. These participants serve two functions. First, they serve in the role of “clients” who 
receive written recommendations from laboratory subjects and act on this advice. From these 
choices, the clients accumulate money and determine the size of the UNICEF donation. 
Second, these participants complete a survey in which they evaluate the extent to which 
various industries and firms are “moral” or “immoral.” These are the ratings that we already 
used in Figure 1 and Table 2.  
5.1 Design 
 Laboratory sessions consisted of 24 participants.15 Before entering the lab, we took a 
portrait photograph of each subject to make labor market outcomes public. Participants were 
asked to make a neutral face while the picture was taken. As subjects could influence the 
amount of a donation to a UNICEF fund providing malaria treatment to children, participants 
read an information sheet at the beginning of the experiment about the consequences of 
malaria and the need for treatments—we adopted wording from public UNICEF materials 
and referred to each donation unit as helping to “save a child” from malaria by providing a 
treatment.  
In the following, we describe each of the choices subjects completed in the laboratory 
session, in detail. We also provide details on the recruitment and role of the clients. 
5.1.1 Behavioral measure of concern for morality (𝜃!"#) 
Participants first played an incentivized game that measures their willingness to lie for 
personal gain while causing harm to others in a non-market environment. The task builds on a 
game by Gneezy et al. (2013), and modifies it such that it mimics the consequences of a lie in 
the immoral work treatment condition in our experimental labor market.  
In the game, Participant A privately observes a computerized die roll and sends a 
message reporting the observed number to Participant B. Participant A may claim that the 
observed number r is either “1”, “2,” “3,” “4,” “5,” or “6,” regardless of the actual number. 
																																								 																				
14 Our behavioral measures of aversion to immoral acts confounds both internally-driven concerns for acting 
immorally and concerns for being perceived as willing to act immorally. Since real-world labor markets 
typically also confound both motives, we do not draw a distinction in our study, but instead combine both 
motives to strengthen the (perceived) immoral nature of work. 	
15 During the experiment, subjects accumulated earnings in “points,” which we converted to money at the rate of 
20 points = 1 CHF ≈ 1 US Dollar. We present the design and results in terms of ultimate payments in Swiss 
francs (CHF) to provide a clearer indication of the economic significance. 
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Participant A receives 5+r CHF, which means that she has an incentive to lie if r is less than 
6. Participant B then decides whether “to follow” or “not to follow” the message sent by 
Participant A. If Participant B does not follow the message, he receives 1.5 CHF and the 
donations to UNICEF are unaffected. If he follows the message and Participant A truthfully 
reported the observed number, Participant B earns 5 CHF and the initial donation to UNICEF 
is increased by an amount corresponding to one additional anti-malarial treatment.16 
However, if Participant B follows the message and Participant A lied, Participant B does not 
earn any money and the donation decreases by one treatment.  
Every participant initially plays the role of Participant A. We use the strategy method 
to elicit Participant A’s message for every possible die roll as this allows us to classify all 
subjects by their strategies. At the end of the experimental session, 5 of the 24 participants in 
the session have their role changed from Participant A to Participant B. These Participants B 
are then matched with five of the remaining Participants A and decide whether or not to 
follow the corresponding message. All participants whose role is not switched—who remain 
as Participant A—are paid based on their choice as Participant A, independently of whether 
or not they are matched with a Participant B.17  
Participants were informed that, at the end of the session and after all choices had 
been made, their decisions as Participant A would be publicly displayed to other participants 
in the session, along with their portrait photograph. This was all explained clearly and 
publicly at the beginning of the experiment.  
5.1.2 Labor market experiment 
In the labor market, subjects play the role of workers competing to be hired by 
automated firms. Before interacting in the market, subjects receive general instructions about 
the labor market and hear a recording of the instructions. Then, participants answer 
comprehension questions about the market, including how prices and quantities are 
determined. Only after the above instructions about market procedures, subjects receive 
information about the nature of the job, which varies by treatment. This ensures that subjects 
in both conditions interpret the market instructions similarly. Their understanding of these 
new instructions about the job is again tested through comprehension questions.  
																																								 																				
16 The actual cost of providing 30 malaria treatments for children, according to UNICEF, was CHF 29. In order 
to create small units with a strong tangible moral component, our instructions always referred to the amount of 
money corresponding to treating “one child” and did not specify the exact monetary amounts. 
17 This implies that Participant As (whose role was not switched) received their own payment with certainty. 
Their decision, however, only had consequences for Participants B (and UNICEF) with a probability of 26.3 
percent. This corresponds, roughly, to the stochastic impacts in our experimental labor market. 
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The job. In both treatment conditions, workers have the opportunity to be hired as an 
“advisor” whose job is to give advice to another uninvolved participant outside the 
laboratory, the “client.” Specifically, the advisor has to write a recommendation to a client to 
select one among ten choice options (labeled by the letters “A” through “J”). The treatment 
varies which option the advisor must recommend to the client. The client receives this 
recommendation, and then selects one of the ten options. The client only knows that the 
option he selects determines his financial reward for completing a survey and influences a 
donation to UNICEF, but does not know the consequences of any specific option. However, 
the client knows that the advisor had complete payoff information at the time of writing the 
recommendation. The client is free to choose the recommended option or any other option.18 
The payoffs associated with each of the ten options are indicated in Table 3. Nine 
options increase the client’s reward by 1 CHF (≈ 1 US Dollar) and increase the donation to 
UNICEF by an amount corresponding to the treatment of one child. However, one of the 10 
options—in this case, D—gives 0 CHF to the client, and reduces the UNICEF donation.  
Table 3: Options available to the “client” 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Additional number of children 
receiving the anti-malarial treatment 1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Financial reward for client (CHF) 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Our two conditions vary only in the recommendation that the advisor is hired to make. 
In neutral work, the advisor’s job is to recommend a specific option that is beneficial to the 
client and to UNICEF (e.g., option G in Table 3). Note that a client is very likely to make 
such a choice independently of any advice, thereby making the impact of such advice largely 
neutral. In immoral work, the job is to recommend the single option with negative 
consequences (option D). In both cases, the advisor makes a recommendation by completing 
a form stating that the recommended option “will save the highest number of children” and 
“will give you the highest financial reward.”19 By recommending option D, however, the 
advisor increases the chance that the client selects the single option that will not increase his 
earnings and that will reduce the donation to UNICEF. We vary the letter of the 
																																								 																				
18 Clients followed the recommendation in 84% of all cases. 
19 Specifically, the advisor has to complete the following recommendation with the option’s name (e.g., G) and 
his initials: “I, [advisor’s initials], have reviewed your possible choices and I recommend that you select the 
option [G]. Following my advice will save the highest number of children and will give you the highest 
financial reward. Your advisor: [advisor’s initials].” 
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recommended bad (neutral) option across immoral (neutral) laboratory sessions. Note that 
conditions only differ in the moral nature of the job; everything else, including effort costs, is 
kept constant. 
The market. Participants are randomly allocated to markets consisting of 6 workers 
who compete to be hired by 6 automated firms. Each worker can provide up to two units of 
labor—one at a low cost (CHF 2.50) and one at a high cost (CHF 5.50). All workers face the 
same induced costs, which the instructions clearly explain.  
At the beginning of every market period, each worker decides whether or not to 
participate in the labor market. In the former case, she (privately) provides two wage 
requests, one for each of the possible units of labor she can provide. Workers may only 
submit wage requests that are at least as high as the corresponding cost of providing that job. 
Firms are simulated by the computer. Each firm can hire up to one unit of labor per 
period. Firms are identical except for the wage that they offer to the workers. Figure 2 
displays the automated demand for labor as well as the induced costs of labor supply. In 
equilibrium, all workers provide one unit of labor and the market wage is between CHF 2.5 
and 2.9.20 The workers have no information about the shape of the automated demand. 
Figure 2: The automated demand and the induced costs of labor supply 
 
We use a uniform-price sealed-offer auction as the market mechanism, as this 
provides desirable features. First, Smith et al. (1982) show that this type of market typically 
converges to the equilibrium prediction. Second, and more importantly, this mechanism 
allows us to automate labor demand (see also Sausgruber and Tyran, 2011) and therefore 
																																								 																				
20 We selected this specific labor demand function to facilitate equilibrium convergence. As long as the wage is 
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keep demand constant between conditions. Once all six workers have submitted their wage 
requests, the computer ranks them from lowest to highest and compares the workers’ wage 
requests to the firms’ wage offers, ranked from highest to lowest. The market wage is then 
the lower of two potential candidates: (i) the last wage offer that is higher than the wage 
request with the same rank, and (ii) the first wage request that is higher than the wage offer 
with the same rank. This mechanism clears the market in that, for the market wage, labor 
supply equals labor demand and all workers with wage requests below the market wage are 
hired. A worker’s earnings in a round equal the market wage times the units of labor provided 
by that worker (0, 1 or 2), minus the corresponding cost; workers who do not participate in 
the market do not make any money. 
Figure 3: Example of feedback provided after every period 
	
The market repeats for a total of 15 periods. The composition as well as the type 
(immoral or neutral) of each market is fixed across periods. At the end of each period, the 
computer reports the market wage, displays the picture of every worker in the market and 
summarizes information regarding each workers’ outcomes across all periods (see Figure 3). 
Specifically, subjects observe employment outcomes, wages and cumulative earnings for all 
workers in their market across periods, and can connect these to the other workers’ identities 
through the photographs. After observing outcomes, those participants who are hired in a 
period complete the paper forms with the recommendations—they write their own initials and 
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the appropriate letter (e.g., “G” or “D” in the earlier example).21 If a firm does not succeed in 
hiring a worker in a period, the firm’s client will not receive any recommendation. This 
implies that in the immoral condition, if a participant is not willing to do the job for the 
market wage, the number of clients who receive bad recommendations (weakly) decreases.	
5.1.3 Procedural details 
 All sessions took place at the Decision Sciences Laboratory (DeSciL) at the Federal 
Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETH) in February, April and May 2017. Participants were 
recruited using hroot (Bock, Baetge and Nicklisch, 2014) from the joint subject pool of the 
University of Zurich and the ETH. Every session consisted of 24 participants, who were only 
accepted at the session if they had previously completed the online survey described in 
Section 6.22 To start a session, subjects had to enter an identifier that allows us to link, 
anonymously, their answers in the online survey with their behavior in the lab. We conducted 
ten sessions, resulting in a total of 240 participants, allocated to 28 markets for immoral work 
and 12 markets for neutral work. The laboratory experiment was implemented with zTree 
(Fischbacher, 2007).  
All instructions were delivered both on paper and with pre-recorded audio files. 
Instructions and materials are available in Appendix F.23  
5.1.4 Survey study with “clients” 
We subsequently recruited a different sample of students on the campus of the 
University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) (N=177). We 
invited student passersby to participate in a brief choice experiment in which they could earn 
money and generate a donation for UNICEF aimed at providing treatments for children 
																																								 																				
21 Subjects are informed that each firm has a probability of 25 percent of having a client in every period, 
independently of whether or not the firm hires a worker. If the firm does not have a client, then the worker’s 
recommendation will be unused, although the worker still completes the recommendation and receives the 
market wage. However, subjects do not know at the time of submitting wage requests or completing the forms at 
the end of a period whether or not there will be a client for that period. This represents, for instance, a case in 
which a worker is hired to prepare promotional materials for a harmful product, which may or may not 
ultimately be seen by potential customers. At the end of the experiment, subjects learn which of their written 
recommendations will be distributed. We did this to lower the number of clients we needed to recruit in the 
follow-up survey. This procedure implies that writing a recommendation only has consequences with a 
probability of 25 percent and, therefore, works against our hypothesized treatment effect.  
22 We made an exception if less than 24 subjects who completed the survey showed up to the experiment. In 
total, three subjects were allowed to participate despite not completing the online survey. 
23	At the conclusion of the laboratory session, we collected several additional individual-level measures. First, 
we measured participants’ affect levels—i.e., pleasure, arousal, and dominance—using the Self-Assessment 
Manikin (Bradley and Lang, 1994). Next, we asked participants whether they thought the clients would or 
would not follow recommendations; this belief was not incentivized. The participants were then prompted to 
answer several questions about the reasons underlying their market behavior. Finally, we measured subjects’ 
concerns for social image using the public self-consciousness scale by Leary et al. (2015).	
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infected by malaria. They were told that they would earn CHF 2 plus possibly some 
additional money for a 5-minute study. These subjects performed two functions.  
First, they served the role of “clients” for the recommendations from the laboratory 
labor market. Each participant made up to six decisions by choosing one of the ten letters 
between A and J. They knew that these decisions influenced their own earnings and also 
possibly the amount of donations to UNICEF, but they did not know the actual payoffs. Each 
decision had the payoff structure in Table 3, but we varied which letter corresponded to the 
bad option. Clients received a mixture of recommendations with good advice, bad advice and 
no advice (corresponding to cases in which a firm was not able to hire a worker). Clients 
were only informed of the total payoffs at the end of their decisions. 
Second, while their payment was determined and prepared, participants completed a 
survey in which they rated various firms and industries on a scale from 1 (very immoral) to 5 
(very moral). For firms, clients also had the option to choose “I don’t know this 
organization.” The complete list of firms and industries is available in Appendix Tables A1 
and A2.  
5.2 Results 
In our analysis, we focus on the existence of an immorality premium and sorting by 
heterogeneous moral types. We first discuss how we construct our incentivized measure of 
concern for morality, 𝜃!"#. Next, we study behavior in the labor market, and whether it can 
be predicted by 𝜃!"#. We then study outcomes in the labor market and their connection to the 
behavioral measure of moral concern (𝜃!"#).  
5.2.1 Construction of 𝜃!"#  
We construct 𝜃!"# based on choices in the behavioral task that subjects completed at 
the beginning of the laboratory session (Appendix Table A3 shows the distribution of 
choices). Let 𝑚!" be the number that individual 𝑖 reports if the actual die roll is 𝑟. We classify 
an individual as a 𝜃! type if 𝑚!" ≥ 𝑟 for all 𝑟 ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,6} and 𝑚!" > 𝑟 for at least one 𝑟; 
that is, participant 𝑖 is classified as having a low concern for morality if he or she lies at least 
once for personal gain and never in a self-harmful manner. We classify the remaining 
participants as 𝜃! types.24 Based on this classification, we have 66 (27.5 percent) 𝜃! types 
																																								 																				
24 A total of 13 subjects (5.4 percent, see Appendix Table A3) harmed themselves at least once with a lie 
(𝑚!" < 𝑟, e.g., reporting 𝑚!" = 1 when 𝑟 = 2). Since these subjects do not appear to be motivated by egoism, 
we classify them as 𝜃!. The remaining 161 subjects classified as 𝜃! always report the true number. Classifying 
subjects that lied in a self-harmful manner as 𝜃! types is conservative in that they act less morally than the 
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and 174 (72.5 percent) 𝜃! types.25 For convenience, given our interpretation of 𝜃 we will 
often refer to 𝜃! types as immoral and 𝜃! types as moral. We next explore the differential 
behavior of the different types in the labor market and the consequences of this behavior. 
5.2.2 Labor supply of moral and immoral types  
Assuming that 𝜃!"# measures a stable concern for morality that translates into labor-
market choices, we should observe differential labor-market behavior between 𝜃!  and 𝜃! 
types, but only when employment requires immoral work. The data confirm this. In Table 4, 
we report the results of a double-hurdle regression of the decision of whether to submit a 
wage request and, conditionally, the actual wage request. The key independent variable is a 
subject’s type from the behavioral task at the beginning of the experiment. In the immoral 
work condition, 𝜃! types opted to submit wage requests less frequently, by almost 30 
percentage points, than 𝜃! types (61.6 percent vs. 90.6 percent, p<0.001). By declining to 
submit a wage request, a subject indicates an unwillingness to do the work even at a wage of 
50 CHF per period, the highest possible wage request in our experiment. Furthermore, 
consistent with the model, 𝜃! types submit conditional reservation wage requests that are 
approximately 0.49 CHF lower than those of 𝜃! types (p=0.073). These effects do not 
become weaker over time—if anything, the greater willingness of 𝜃! types to participate in 
the immoral labor market becomes slightly stronger over time.26 Moreover, 21.5 percent of 
the 𝜃! workers never participated in the market (i.e., refused to submit wage requests in any 
of the 15 periods), but this is true of only 4.3 percent of 𝜃! workers (t = -3.78; p=0.001). 
Hence, our behavioral measure of a subject’s moral type predicts their willingness to seek 
employment in an immoral job.  
In the neutral work condition, however, non-participation is virtually non-existent—
there were only 3 cases in total, representing 0.28 percent of all observations. That is, there is 
nearly universal participation when the job does not involve immoral behavior. Moreover, the 
average wage requests of 𝜃! (CHF 2.91) and 𝜃! (CHF 2.89) types do not differ in magnitude 
or in statistical significance (p-value from truncated linear regression =	0.827). 	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
honest subjects (see Table A5 in the Appendix). Results do not change if we drop these subjects or if we classify 
them instead as 𝜃!.  
25 In principle, we could classify subjects into more than two categories—e.g., conditional on the number of lies 
or based on the expected payoff from lying (!
!
𝑚!" − 𝑟!!!! ). Due to the low number of subjects with different 
lying-patterns (see Appendix Table A3), we opt for a binary classification. However, we find similar results if 
we use alternative classifications (see Appendix Table A5).  
26 Specifically, if we add a linear time trend to the hurdle model and its interaction with 𝜃!
!"# (see Appendix 
Table A4), we find that 𝜃! types become slightly more likely to participate over time and provide lower 
reservation wages, relative to 𝜃! types. However, both coefficients are small and statistically insignificant.  
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	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
Low-theta (𝜽𝑳
𝑬𝒙𝒑) 1.024*** -0.494* -0.018 (4.64) (-1.79) (-0.22) 
Constant 0.295** 4.056*** 2.909*** (2.41) (20.20) (43.79) 
Sigma  2.64*** 0.609***  (7.72) (10.57) 
Condition Immoral work Immoral work Neutral work 
N 2520 1755 1077 
LL (pseudo) -1427.9 -4194.1 -993.9 
Notes: Estimates from Craggs double-hurdle Model: (1) is a probit model; (2) and (3) are truncated linear 
regressions (truncated from above at 50 CHF). Models (1) and (2) use only data from the immoral work 
condition; model (3) uses only data from the neutral work condition. For neutral work, we focus on reservations 
wages as we have only 3 incidences in which a subject did not participate. Independent variables: Low-theta in 
{0, 1}. Standard errors clustered at market level; z-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p 
< 0.01. 
Figure 4: Empirical labor supply for neutral and immoral work in the laboratory	
 
Notes: Wage requests are ranked within each market period of each group. The figure shows the average wage 
request for each rank for both the immoral work and the neutral work conditions. Note that wage requests are 
censored at the maximal wage request that subjects could make, 50 CHF. For this figure, we set the wage 
requests of subjects who are not willing to participate to CHF 50. Therefore, the supply curve for the immoral 
work condition should be interpreted as a lower bound. 
Thus, we observe that 𝜃! types withdraw their participation and make higher wage 
requests when work requires immoral behavior. However, when the work activity is neutral, 
both types almost always participate and make similar wage requests. As a direct 
consequence of these observations, labor supply differs substantially between the two kinds 
of markets, as shown in Figure 4.27 For neutral work, labor supply is fairly close to the 
																																								 																				
27 Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the labor supply if we only consider the last 5 periods. Figure A2 in the 


























induced costs. However, for any given wage, there is a substantially lower supply of labor 
with immoral work.  
In the following sections, we explore the implications of the above heterogeneous 
behavior for labor market outcomes. 
5.2.3 Wage premium for immoral work 
We find a substantial immorality premium, as shown in Figure 5. This follows 
directly from the differential labor supply in Figure 4. While market wages in the neutral 
work condition converge toward the equilibrium prediction of CHF 2.90, the average market 
wage is persistently higher for immoral work and this difference is statistically significant in 
a t-test from a regression with standard errors clustered at the market-level 
(coefficient=2.581, t=6.00, p<0.001). Hence, our laboratory labor market shows causal 
evidence of a substantial and persistent wage premium for immoral work.28 
Figure 5: Immorality wage premium in laboratory labor markets 
 
We also find persistent differences in employment levels in the two markets (Figure 
A3 in the Appendix). While markets for neutral work converge to the equilibrium prediction 
of 6, the average market quantity remains below 4 in the immoral work condition. This 
difference is significant in a t-test comparing the means (coefficient=-1.201, t=-6.30, 
p<0.001). Moreover, the trends in Figure 5 provide further evidence that the manifestation of 
																																								 																				
28 A natural concern might be that the immorality premium results from the specific labor demand structure that 
we employ. However, as evident from the differences in labor supply in Figure 4, workers are sufficiently 
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𝜃! types’ morality in labor market behavior does not erode over time. This persistence is 
remarkable given the high amount of social information provided at the end of each market 
period: in the immoral work condition, participants who forgo working see other participants 
less concerned with morality repeatedly earning high wages due to their own reluctance to act 
immorally.  
5.2.4 Sorting in immoral labor markets 
We next turn to our second main prediction, that 𝜃! types will be disproportionately 
hired in the market for immoral work. Figure 6 shows that, indeed, 𝜃! types are consistently 
employed less frequently in the immoral work condition. Table 5 shows that, on average, 𝜃! 
types are 26.6 (=26.8 − 0.2) percentage points more likely to be employed than 𝜃! types 
(column 1). This difference is statistically significant (p<0.001) and robust to adding market 
fixed effects (column 2). The results are similar if we use, as a dependent variable, the 
number of work units provided (0, 1 or 2) rather than a binary measure of employment 
(columns 3 and 4). In the neutral work condition, we do not find a significant difference in 
employment rates between the two types (columns 1 to 4; see also Appendix Figure A4). This 
corroborates that the difference in hiring rates in the immoral work condition is driven by 
differences in concerns for morality and not some other difference between 𝜃! and 𝜃! types. 


























Table 5: Relationship between 𝜽𝑬𝒙𝒑 and outcomes in the experimental labor markets 
Dependent variable: Employment rate Number of work units Market income 































N 240 240 240 240 240 240 
R2 0.179 0.319 0.103 0.174 0.138 0.243 
p-value: 𝜽𝑳
𝑬𝒙𝒑 + 𝜽𝑳
𝑬𝒙𝒑*IW = 0 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0009 0.026 0.001 
Market FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Independent variables: Low-theta in {0, 1}, Immoral 
work in {0, 1}. Standard errors clustered at market level; t-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; 
*** - p < 0.01. 
5.2.5 Market income in immoral labor markets 
Two additional predictions address heterogeneous treatment effects on worker’s 
utility. As a simple proxy for utility, we use the sum of all earnings accumulated by a worker 
over the 15 market periods.29  
Figure 7: Market income by moral type 
 
Notes: Average market income by treatment condition and moral type. Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals. 
																																								 																				
29 As we show in Appendix C, the same results obtain if we use a slightly more complicated measure that 

























First, our theoretical analysis predicts that the immoral types benefit from an increase 
in the job’s immorality (Proposition 3). Figure 7 and results from linear regressions (see 
Table 5, Columns 5 and 6) show that the 𝜃! types earn more market income than the 𝜃! types 
in the immoral work condition. The difference of CHF 7.09 (8.42 – 1.33 in column 5) is 
statistically significant (p=0.026). Note that the potential market income is constrained by the 
market wage. If we control for the market wage by adding market fixed effects (column 6), 
the 𝜃! types are estimated to earn CHF 10.81 more than the 𝜃! types (p=0.001). Thus, as 
predicted, immoral types earn considerably more in a market for immoral work. There is no 
such difference in markets for neutral work; if anything, 𝜃! types earn slightly less than the 
𝜃! types. 
Figure 8: Externalities of moral behavior for immoral types  
 
Notes: Average market income by moral type and market composition; data only from immoral work condition. 
A subject is in a market with many low-theta workers if  the number of (other) low-theta workers is 2 or more 
and in a market with few low-theta workers if  the number of (other) low-theta workers is lower than 2. Error 
bars show the 95% confidence intervals. 
Finally, our analysis predicts that, in the immoral work condition, immoral types have 
higher utility in the presence of more moral types (Proposition 4). To test this prediction, for 
each subject we count the number of other 𝜃! workers in the market and split the sample 
based on the median of this measure. We thus classify a subject as being in a market with few 
𝜃! types if the number of (other) 𝜃! workers is lower than 2, and as being in a market with 
many 𝜃! types if the number is 2 or more. Using only the immoral work condition, this results 
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subjects’ mean earnings, based on their own type and the composition of others’ types in their 
market. The income of 𝜃! types is CHF 4.33 higher in a market with few 𝜃! types than in one 
with many 𝜃! types (t=2.05, p=0.051, see Table A6 in the Appendix). However, for 𝜃! types, 
being in a market with few other 𝜃! types increases income by an additional CHF 16.35 
(t=3.53, p=0.002), resulting in a total difference of CHF 20.68 (t=4.29, p<0.001).30  
Our laboratory findings thus confirm all four predictions from our theoretical analysis. 
We find evidence that people with high concern for morality consistently refuse to do 
immoral jobs (or require a high wage), thereby decreasing labor supply and increasing wages 
and producing a persistent immorality premium. As a consequence, subjects with a low 
concern for morality are better off in markets for immoral work, particularly when in the 
presence of more moral subjects.31 
6. Stated real-world employment preferences and sorting 
Several days (4-7) before the laboratory session, subjects completed an online 
survey.32 This survey includes questions designed to measure subjects’ expectations of their 
own future labor market outcomes, including the willingness to work for different firms and 
industries and expected future wages, and questions eliciting subjects’ concern for morality. 
The survey gives us a second measure of moral concern (𝜃) and, more importantly, allows us 
to investigate whether subjects’ moral types predict not only behavior in laboratory labor 
markets, but also expectations for labor market outcomes outside the laboratory.  
We first construct an individual measure of concern for morality based on the answers 
to the psychological survey questions (𝜃!"#). We then show that this second measure of 
concern for morality correlates both with the comparable behavioral measure from the 
laboratory experiment (𝜃!"#) and with outcomes in the laboratory labor market. This 
validation of 𝜃!"# is useful for future research, as it is based solely on survey questions that 
are easier to collect than the incentivized laboratory measure. Moreover, the comparison of 
𝜃!"# and 𝜃!"# provides some evidence on the stability of moral concerns across time and 
																																								 																				
30 If we use the number of (other) 𝜃! types in the market instead of doing a median split, we find similar results. 
For 𝜃! types, the income is estimated to increase by CHF 2.45 per additional 𝜃! type in the market (t=2.10, 
p=0.045). For 𝜃! types, the income increases by CHF 8.21 for every additional 𝜃! type (t=2.62, p=0.014).  
31 One additional consequence of heterogeneous concerns for morality is that the income distribution differs 
substantially between the two treatment conditions. While in the neutral work condition, income is almost 
equally distributed (Gini coefficient=0.15), we find substantial income inequality in the immoral work condition 
(Gini coefficient=0.38). Appendix Figure A5 shows the Lorenz curves for both conditions.	
32 Subjects could only sign up for both the online survey and the lab study. Three (out of 240) subjects did not 
complete the online-survey. We exclude these subjects from this part of the analysis.  
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contexts, which is necessary for heterogeneous moral concerns to persistently influence labor 
market behavior.  
We then show that both 𝜃!"# and 𝜃!"# predict stated labor market preferences in 
labor markets outside the laboratory, consistent with the prediction regarding sorting 
(Proposition 2).  
6.1 The online questionnaire 
We first asked subjects several questions about their future labor-market expectations. 
Subjects were shown a list of 26 well-known companies in Switzerland and another list 
consisting of the 20 industries in Figure 1. Both lists are available in Tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix. Participants rated their willingness to work for each firm and industry (1: not at all 
willing; 5: very much willing). For firms, participants also had the option to select, “I don’t 
know this organization.” In addition, we asked subjects to provide unstructured responses 
stating beliefs about their future career trajectories—specifically, what work they expected to 
do after their studies and how much they expected to earn at the age of 40. Note that these 
were the first questions participants answered, meaning that when they encountered them 
they had not been exposed to any references to morality or moral behavior. 
Subjects next encountered several multi-item scales intended to measure an 
individual’s broad concern for morality and moral acts. These were: 
1) HEXACO-PI. We administered 10 items from the short version of the HEXACO 
Personal Inventory (Ashton and Lee, 2009) related to the factor “Honesty-Humility”—
consisting of the four traits, sincerity (3 items), fairness (3 items), greed avoidance (2 
items) and modesty (2 items). Every item describes a thought that a moral or immoral 
person might have and participants indicate the extent to which each thought reflects their 
own opinions.  
2) Protected Values. The Protected Values scale (Gibson et al., 2013) measures an 
individual’s position regarding values that can be seen as inviolable, and not substitutable 
against money, and that are usually central to the person’s identity. In our case, and 
following Gibson et al. (2013), we adapted the Protected Values to a situation where a 
financial adviser can give bad investment advice to a client for personal benefit. First, 5 
items assess the morality of this behavior (Protected value 1); second, 4 items examine 
how truthfulness matters in such a situation (Protected value 2). 
3) Integrity and Work Ethics Test. We used two items from an online test designed to 
allow firms to measure the integrity of job applicants (Work ethics 1, Work ethics 2). In 
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each item, participants read fictitious dialogues between two characters with different 
opinions about a situation (e.g., calling in sick at work to enjoy a sunny day outside). 
Participants then rate with which character they have greater agreement. 
4) Charity attitude index. We used a 9-item scale developed by Brashear et al. (2000) in 
which participants rate statements regarding how important they perceive it is to help 
others in society and how positive and useful they perceive work done by charities. 
In each case, subjects expressed agreement or disagreement with statements on either a 5-
point or 7-point Likert scale. Thorough descriptions of these survey scales are provided in the 
Appendix F and in Table A7 in the Appendix.33 The online questionnaire was implemented 
with the Qualtrics software. 
6.2 Constructing 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓 
We next discuss how we construct a survey-based measure of concern for morality, 
𝜃!"#. Table 6 lists the 9 subscales from the morality measures; Appendix Table A7 provides 
summary statistics. We aggregated these nine psychological measures by performing a 
principal-component factor analysis. We selected the factor with the highest eigenvalue 
(eigenvalue = 2.44) to represent 𝜃!"#.34 Column 1 in Table 6 presents the corresponding 
factor loadings. We normalized 𝜃!"# such that it lies between 0 and 1; the resulting variable 
has a mean of 0.5 and a median of 0.5. Low values represent a low concern for morality. 
Appendix Figure A6 shows the distribution of 𝜃!"#. Given our interpretation of 𝜃, we will 
often refer to subjects with a low 𝜃!"# as immoral types and subjects with high 𝜃!"# as moral 
types.  	
6.3 Does 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓 predict behavior in the laboratory? 
To validate 𝜃!"#, we investigate how it correlates with behavior in the laboratory. 
Table 6, column 2, shows the coefficients from independent simple regressions of a subject’s 
type measured by the behavioral laboratory task, 𝜃!"#, on each item	comprising 𝜃!"#. The 
dependent variable is binary, indicating that a subject is a 𝜃! type according to 𝜃!"#. The 
results show a significant positive correlation between 𝜃!"# and all personality measures, 
																																								 																				
33 We also asked subjects whether several non-profit organizations (including UNICEF) are worth supporting 
and collected additional personal characteristics using a short version of the Big Five (Gosling et al., 2003), 
which identifies individuals’ extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, openness, and conscientiousness, but is 
largely orthogonal to morality. We also elicited several demographic characteristics, such as age, gender and 
field of study. 
34 In the Appendix (Tables A8, A9 and A10), we show that our results are robust to different aggregation 
mechanisms. Specifically, we look at two alternatives: i) each of the nine survey measures is given equal weight 
and ii) the weight of the measures is determined by a regression of 𝜃!"# on the survey measures.  
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except for Work ethics 1 and Work ethics 2. Consistent with the positive relationship of the 
individual items, a regression of 𝜃!"# on 𝜃!"# shows a positive and significant relationship 
(coefficient=0.723, t=4.32, p<0.001), that is, a person who is characterized by a low concern 
for morality according to our survey-based measures is more likely to lie self-servingly in the 
behavioral measure in the experiment. These generally positive relationships suggest that 
𝜃!"#  and our survey-based measures capture similar individual characteristics.  
Table 6: Items comprising 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓 and their relationship to 𝜽𝑬𝒙𝒑 
 
Factor loadings 
(weights for 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓) 
(1) 
Regression 
coefficient of 𝜽𝑬𝒙𝒑 
(2) 
Protected value 1 0.664 0.540*** (3.66) 
Protected value 2 0.708 0.352** (2.22) 
Work ethics 1 0.213 -0.039 (-0.39) 
Work ethics 2 0.252 0.042 (0.52) 
HEXACO sincerity 0.482 0.362** (2.53) 
HEXACO fairness 0.611 0.353*** (2.61) 
HEXACO greed avoidance 0.477 0.225* (1.73) 
HEXACO modesty 0.508 0.236* (1.79) 
Charity attitude index 0.545 0.711*** (3.11) 
Notes: Each subscale is constructed by taking averages over all items of the scale, and then normalized such 
that it lies between 0 and 1. (1): Factor loadings from principal-component factor analysis of survey measures 
on 𝜃!"#. (2): Coefficient estimates of linear probability models. N = 237 for each regression (3 subjects did not 
complete the online-survey and are excluded). Dependent variable: being a high-theta type according to 𝜃!"#. 
Independent variables: survey measures in [0,1], higher numbers indicate more morality. Robust standard 
errors; t-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
We next consider the extent to which 𝜃!"#  also predicts participants’ behavior in the 
laboratory labor market, particularly in the immoral work condition.35 Results from a linear 
regression of the employment rate on 𝜃!"# indicate that those participants with the lowest 
concerns for morality (that is, participants with 𝜃!"# = 0) are 43.9 percentage points more 
likely to be hired in markets for immoral labor than participants with the highest possible 
concern for morality (that is, with 𝜃!"# = 1). This difference is marginally statistically 
significant (p=0.057, see Appendix Table A8, column 1). A less noisy measure of subjects’ 
																																								 																				
35	Figure A7 in the Appendix displays the labor supply in a (simulated) labor market with only low 𝜃!"# or only 
high 𝜃!"#types. 
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market behavior is their actual choices. Results from a hurdle model indicate that those 
subjects with the lowest concerns for morality are 52.1 percentage points more likely to 
participate in markets for immoral work by submitting a wage request than individuals 
having the highest possible concerns for morality (p=0.015, see Appendix Table A9). In the 
neutral work condition, as expected, we do not find substantial differences in employment 
rates or in labor market behavior between the two types. We thus conclude that 𝜃!"# is 
predictive of behavior in the laboratory and could be a valuable measure future research on 
moral preferences.	
6.4 Do 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓 and 𝜽𝑬𝒙𝒑 predict stated real-world labor market preferences? 
Our study collects two measures of subjects’ concern for morality (𝜃!"# and 𝜃!"#). 
The online survey also elicits the same subjects’ willingness to work for several firms and 
industries, without any reference to morality. We also separately obtained independent 
ratings of the perceived immorality of these firms and industries, from the “clients” (see 
Section 5.1.4). In this section, we use all of this information to analyze how our measures of 
concern for morality connect to expectations about labor market outcomes outside the 
laboratory. 
We create a measure of perceived firm immorality in the same way we created 
perceived industry immorality: by first scaling the ratings such that they lie between -1 (very 
moral) and +1 (very immoral), and then averaging them.36 We use these variables as noisy 
measures of the immorality of work, 𝐼(𝑗), in industry (or, firm) 𝑗, a key component of our 
theoretical analysis. The horizontal axes in Figures 9a and 9c plot the resulting normalized 
ratings for industries in our sample, the horizontal axes in Figures 9b and 9d plot the 
normalized ratings for firms (see also Appendix Tables A1 and A2).  
Our focus in this section is to investigate whether these perceptions of industry and 
firm immorality interact with our subjects’ measured concern for morality (either 𝜃!"# or 
𝜃!"#) to produce differential labor market preferences. For this purpose, we normalized 
subjects’ stated willingness to work for firms and industries, such that they take values 
between 0 (not at all willing) and 1 (very much willing).37  
																																								 																				
36 Remember that for firms, clients also had the option to choose “I don’t know this organization” instead of 
rating the firm. To calculate the perceived firm immorality, we exclude these observations. Alternatively, we 
could code these as neutral ratings. These two measures are highly correlated (corr=0.9854). Our results do not 
change substantially if we use the alternative measure (see Table A11). 
37 Incidentally, the list of industries accidentally omitted five industries for five participants that participated in 
the first lab session, meaning we are missing these data. Other than these cases, all subjects completed the full 
questionnaire. We exclude all these missing observations from the analysis. Regarding willingness to work for 
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Figure 9: Correlation between the difference in willingness to work between moral and 
immoral types and perceived immorality of industries/firms 
 
(a) Industries, 𝜃!"# 
 
(b) Firms, 𝜃!"# 
 
(c) Industries, 𝜃!"# 
 
(d) Firms, 𝜃!"# 
Source: Survey study (Perceived immorality), online survey (Willingness to work, 𝜃!"#), laboratory experiment 
(𝜃!"#) 
Notes: Differences in willingness to work: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models of the participants’ 
willingness to work for different industries (a and c) or firms (b and d) on 𝜃!
!"# (a and b) or 𝜃!"# (c and d). 
Dependent variable: Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 
0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Observations where subjects did not know the 
firm (“I don’t know this organization”) or did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Independent 
variables: a and b use 𝜃!"# to classify participants, where 𝜃!
!"#=0 for low- theta types and 𝜃!
!"#=1 for high-
theta types, while c and d use 𝜃!"# in [0,1]. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 
means neutral and 1 means very immoral. 
The vertical axes of Figures 9a and 9c plot the difference in willingness to work for 
the industries between subjects who were classified as moral or immoral, according to 𝜃!"# 
(Figure 9a) or 𝜃!"# (Figure 9c). The strong negative relationship across all of these figures 
indicates that subjects classified as immoral using either our survey-based or behavioral task 
are, on average, more willing to work for industries that others perceive as immoral.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
firms, participants also had the option to choose “I don’t know this organization.” This option was chosen in 
17.8 percent of all answers. We also exclude these observations. We obtain similar results if we classify such 














Perfumes (wholes.) Tobacco (wholes.)
Sports facilities























































































































































































Table 7, columns (1) to (4) provide statistical evidence of the relationships in Figures 
9a and 9c. The dependent variable in the regressions is a subject’s willingness to work for an 
industry, while the explanatory variables include the perceived industry immorality (𝐼(𝑗), 
obtained from a separate group of respondents), the subject’s concern for acting morally (𝜃) 
and the interaction of these two terms. While there is little evidence of a systematic difference 
in willingness to work for neutral industries between moral and immoral types, subjects’ 
moral types have much stronger predictive power for their willingness to work in industries 
perceived as immoral. This pattern is significant at least at the 5%-level, holds for both 
measures of individual moral concerns, 𝜃!"# and 𝜃!"#, and is robust to controlling for 
subjects’ gender, age, Swiss nationality, area of study, mean industry wages, industry size 
(number of employees), and industry sales. 
Table 7: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on 
perceived immorality and moral types  
Dependent variable: Willingness to work for industry j Willingness to work for firm j 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Perceived  

















Type from  









(-1.96)   
𝜽𝑯
𝑬𝒙𝒑 * I(j) -0.078*** (-2.56) 
-0.078** 




(-4.38)   
Type from survey  









𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓 * I(j)   -0.479*** 	(-5.22) 
-0.479*** 





N 4715 4715 4715 4715 5064 5064 5064 5064 
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable:  Willingness to work is in {0, 
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much 
willing to work. Observations where subjects did not know the firm (“I don’t know this organization”) or did 
not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Independent variables: (1), (2), (5) and (6) use 𝜃!
!"# to classify 
participants, where 𝜃!
!"#=0 for low- theta types and 𝜃!
!"#=1 for high-theta types, while (3), (4), (7) and (8) use  
𝜃!"# (in [0,1]) instead. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 
means very immoral. Control variables: age, gender, Swiss nationality, subject of study, average wage industry 
2016 (SLFS; only for industries), industry size 2016 (STATENT; only for industries), industry sales 2015 (Value 
Added Tax Statistics; only for industries). Standard errors clustered at individual and industry/firm level 
(Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2011); z-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
We repeat the same analysis using data on subjects’ willingness to work for our 
selection of well-known firms in Switzerland. The vertical axis of Figures 9b and 9d plot the 
difference in willingness to work for firms between subjects who were classified as moral and 
immoral according to 𝜃!"# (Figure 9b) or 𝜃!"# (Figure 9d). Again, subjects classified as 
immoral are, on average, more willing to work for firms perceived as immoral. This 
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relationship is confirmed by Table 7, columns (5) to (8): subjects less concerned with moral 
behavior are more willing to work for firms that other people rate as more immoral (p<0.01), 
which is again true for both measures of concern for morality (𝜃!"# and 𝜃!"#). Hence, we 
find that firms that are perceived as immoral attract applicants with a lower concern for 
morality.38  
The above analysis provides evidence supporting our second main prediction in labor 
markets outside the laboratory. Those who are least concerned with morality are significantly 
more willing to work in firms that are generally perceived as less moral. A limitation of this 
analysis is that it is based on hypothetical future choices. However, Wiswall and Zafar (2018) 
provide evidence that such stated preferences are predictive of ultimate employment. To 
further validate subjects’ stated real-world labor market preferences, we can test whether the 
stated employment preferences correlate with individual employment rates in the immoral 
work condition of our laboratory experiment. Indeed, we find that people who are hired more 
often for the immoral job have a statistically significantly higher stated willingness to work in 
immoral industries outside the laboratory (see Table A13 in the Appendix). 
Finally, in the online survey, we also asked subjects to rate how much they expect to 
earn when they reach the age of 40. A regression of expected future wages on 𝜃!"# suggests a 
positive relationship such that the least moral types (𝜃!"# = 0) report expected income that is 
30,272 CHF higher, on average, than the expected income of the most moral types (𝜃!"# =
1), but this relationship is not statistically significant (p=0.125). While the point estimate of 
this relationship is consistent with the model’s prediction of a wage premium for the types 
least concerned with morality, the earnings expectations measures over such a long time 
horizon—on average, 18 years—are perhaps less reliable than the more contemporaneous 
statements of willingness to work for different firms. 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
We investigate whether heterogeneity in individual preferences for avoiding immoral 
work and the perceived immorality of work influence the jobs that individuals select and 
individuals’ earnings. Our study employs a laboratory experiment, surveys and administrative 
data to identify heterogeneity in concerns for morality and to create (or, measure) variation in 
the immorality of jobs. We use these different kinds of data to test two main hypotheses—
																																								 																				
38	As we show in the Appendix, the differential willingness to work for immoral firms and industries by moral 
and immoral types does not depend on how we construct 𝜃!"# (Table A10), nor on how we deal with missing 
observations (Table A11, Table A12).	
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first, that jobs generally perceived as immoral will yield a wage premium and, second, that 
individuals less concerned with moral behavior will be more likely to sort into such jobs. 
In a laboratory setting, we use a simple behavioral task to classify individuals as 
“moral” or “immoral” types. We then show that this characteristic predicts the outcomes that 
individuals obtain as we experimentally vary only the immorality of work. We find support 
for both our hypotheses. Labor markets for immoral work yield significantly higher wages. 
Moreover, immoral workers are significantly more likely to be hired for immoral work than 
are moral workers; but this relationship disappears in a labor market for neutral work. We 
also find that a market for immoral work benefits immoral types, particularly when they 
compete with fewer other immoral types.  
We separately use survey responses to classify the immorality of real-world firms and 
industries and show that industries classified as immoral pay higher wages. We also use 
surveys to obtain a separate measure of workers’ moral types. This individual characteristic is 
correlated with the moral type measured in the laboratory and predicts subjects’ behaviors in 
the laboratory labor market. Moreover, both the survey-based and lab-based measures of 
morality also predict stated preferences for working in firms and industries outside the 
laboratory that vary in their perceived morality. Using either measure, workers less concerned 
with morality are more willing to work for firms and industries generally perceived as less 
moral. 
Given the significance of many social ills produced by immoral work practices, such 
as deceptive marketing of socially harmful products, our study sheds important new light on 
the interaction between individual’s types, their willingness to do immoral work and the 
resulting labor-market outcomes. Our work also has several important policy implications.  
First, in those jobs and industries with the greatest potential to do societal harm, social 
welfare will often be higher when workers voluntarily internalize the negative impacts of 
their actions and forgo potentially profitable opportunities. For instance, a weapons 
manufacturer may restrict sales to conflict areas if top management has a moral aversion to 
the social harm caused by such sales. However, our evidence suggests that it is the least 
moral types who will sort into these industries and that, therefore, labor market sorting will 
make it less likely that such internalization will occur. This also creates an important contrast 
between our findings and related work on sorting by mission-oriented types into firms or jobs 
with a pro-social orientation. In such cases, sorting may often be beneficial for society, as 
those who care about a cause become the ones who impact it; in our case, however, those 
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who care about doing “good” may avoid the opportunity to determine how much “bad” takes 
place. 
Second, another implication of our empirical findings is that the perception that a 
firm, industry or type of work is immoral may be self-reinforcing. If, as our results indicate, 
the perception that work involves immoral acts leads people less concerned with acting 
morally to differentially opt into such work, then the end result of such sorting may be a 
workforce more likely to commit immoral acts. Even if some of the firms and industries that 
we study do not actually involve any inherently immoral activities in their line of work, the 
fact that they are disproportionately more attractive to people more willing to do immoral 
things may result in a self-confirming greater prevalence for immoral behavior. Thus, firms 
and industries that regularly confront the perception that they involve immoral work—such as 
the banking sector—may need to be particularly attuned to such selection in their hiring. 
Finally, our theoretical analysis predicts—in line with our experimental data—that the 
least moral types are overcompensated by the immorality premium. This is in stark contrast 
to Mankiw’s (2010) “just deserts theory”—that is, everybody should receive his or her 
contribution to society. Our work suggests a perverse case in which those willing to do the 
most socially harmful acts may instead benefit from doing so. Moreover, this benefit is the 
direct result of the actions by others who are concerned with behaving morally. Indeed, we 
provide evidence that a shift in preferences toward a greater aversion to performing immoral 
work may reward those individuals who are least concerned with morality. 
Of course, our work leaves open many important questions regarding the precise 
characteristics that lead some kinds of work to be differentially perceived as immoral and the 
specific nature of the preference underlying workers’ market behavior. Nevertheless, as the 
above examples make clear, the differential sorting by people more or less concerned with 
immoral behavior into different lines of work has important implications for the extent to 
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Appendix A – Additional Analysis 
Figure A1: Labor supply for neutral and immoral work in the laboratory, last 5 periods 		
	
Figure A2: Labor supply for immoral work in the laboratory for different types (𝜽𝑬𝒙𝒑) 
 
Notes: Labor supplies conditional on types are calculated with a simulation: 6 labor market decisions (first and 
second wage request) of high-theta (or, low-theta) types are randomly drawn (without replacement) from our 
sample. We then calculate the labor supply for this group of people. We repeat this 1000 times (with 
replacement) and take the average of these 1000 individual labor supplies. This approach differs from the one 
we use in Figure 4 and Figure A1, where we take the average of the actual labor supplies in the different market 





















































Figure A3: Market quantities in laboratory labor markets 
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Figure A5: Income inequalities across conditions 
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Figure A7: Labor supply for immoral work in the laboratory for different types (𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓) 
 
Notes: High-theta survey is 1 if 𝜃!"# is lower than the median of  𝜃!"#. Labor supplies are calculated with 
simulations: 6 labor market decisions (first and second wage request) of high-theta survey (or, low-theta 
survey) types are randomly drawn (without replacement) from our sample. We then calculate the labor supply 
for this group of people. We repeat this 1000 times (with replacement) and take the average of these 1000 























































































































































All industries 32,638 41.00 3.59 42.25 0.57 0.58 0.35 0.51 0.64 9.56 0.87 0.17 106.46 0.94 -0.18 
(20.11) (0.54) (11.16) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (9.21) (0.24) (0.37) (87.54) (1.27) (0.22) 
Processing of tea and 
coffee 138 
38.88 3.60 41.29 0.66 0.67 0.24 0.59 0.55 8.78 0.93 0.10 3.10 0.22 -0.11 
(14.00) (0.35) (10.34) (0.47) (0.47) (0.43) (0.49) (0.50) (8.94) (0.20) (0.30) (0.43) (0.02) (-0.41) 
Manufacture of tobacco 
products 162 
51.01 3.85 39.42 0.59 0.59 0.45 0.41 0.52 9.63 0.92 0.03 2.24 11.79 0.47 
(20.20) (0.44) (8.26) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (8.84) (0.10) (0.16) (0.15) (0.97) (-0.42) 
Manufacture of paper and 
paperboard 96 
42.33 3.69 46.00 0.78 0.77 0.35 0.50 0.57 16.80 0.96 0.09 1.58 2.11 -0.06 
(16.25) (0.33) (10.77) (0.42) (0.42) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (13.32) (0.10) (0.29) (0.22) (1.11) (-0.37) 
Manufacture of weapons 
and ammunitions 104 
53.26 3.91 48.53 0.95 0.58 0.57 0.37 0.83 16.36 0.96 0.10 1.44 0.46 0.71 
(20.66) (0.37) (10.85) (0.22) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.38) (13.49) (0.06) (0.31) (0.10) (0.05) (-0.40) 
Manufacture of electronic 
components 1,133 
44.79 3.72 43.27 0.68 0.61 0.51 0.37 0.53 10.47 0.93 0.06 22.08 0.66 -0.01 
(18.21) (0.41) (10.59) (0.47) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (9.64) (0.14) (0.24) (0.76) (0.16) (-0.42) 
Construction of buildings 3,600 37.87 3.57 43.21 0.91 0.70 0.21 0.48 0.48 11.16 0.95 0.14 82.97 0.43 -0.28 
(13.18) (0.40) (10.73) (0.28) (0.46) (0.41) (0.50) (0.50) (9.89) (0.15) (0.34) (0.79) (0.01) (-0.39) 
Maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles 2,664 
34.64 3.48 41.38 0.82 0.61 0.19 0.71 0.66 11.47 0.92 0.26 58.65 0.54 -0.28 
(12.89) (0.38) (12.08) (0.38) (0.49) (0.40) (0.45) (0.47) (10.47) (0.21) (0.44) (0.33) (0.01) (-0.40) 
Wholesale of tobacco 
products 87 
58.75 3.96 45.10 0.55 0.70 0.51 0.49 0.65 11.05 0.93 0.13 1.72 1.49 0.44 
(27.28) (0.48) (9.98) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (7.86) (0.15) (0.33) (0.07) (0.19) (-0.38) 
Wholesale of clothing and 
footwear 306 
38.92 3.54 40.21 0.31 0.45 0.38 0.53 0.52 7.16 0.84 0.16 6.08 1.80 0.10 
(18.97) (0.51) (10.73) (0.46) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (6.70) (0.24) (0.37) (0.18) (0.22) (-0.46) 
Wholesale of perfume and 
cosmetics 353 
53.47 3.84 39.78 0.34 0.60 0.58 0.36 0.40 7.80 0.89 0.15 6.19 1.89 0.12 
(28.01) (0.54) (10.03) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (6.48) (0.19) (0.35) (0.26) (0.22) (-0.37) 























































































































Wholesale of watches and 
jewelry 158 
44.16 3.71 43.89 0.42 0.58 0.46 0.48 0.55 8.09 0.88 0.20 2.65 2.13 0.04 
(19.05) (0.40) (10.68) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (8.04) (0.19) (0.40) (0.17) (0.30) (-0.41) 
Hotels and similar 
accommodation 2,658 
27.06 3.22 40.69 0.40 0.55 0.19 0.55 0.40 7.16 0.85 0.16 59.16 0.16 -0.34 
(10.58) (0.48) (11.24) (0.49) (0.50) (0.39) (0.50) (0.49) (7.59) (0.26) (0.36) (0.75) (0.00) (-0.37) 
Restaurants and mobile food 
activities 5,560 
25.12 3.14 40.55 0.43 0.56 0.14 0.57 0.46 6.58 0.79 0.21 94.45 0.15 -0.33 
(9.96) (0.47) (11.92) (0.49) (0.50) (0.34) (0.50) (0.50) (7.35) (0.29) (0.41) (1.03) (0.00) (-0.37) 
Monetary intermediations 7,286 56.00 3.94 42.00 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.42 0.73 10.65 0.91 0.19 109.31 2.26 0.11 
(21.87) (0.44) (10.37) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.44) (9.42) (0.18) (0.40) (2.05) (0.88) (-0.40) 
Credit granting 79 53.62 3.90 40.00 0.46 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.67 5.45 0.89 0.11 1.23 1.50 0.15 
(22.28) (0.39) (8.59) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (5.73) (0.17) (0.31) (0.03) (0.83) (-0.41) 
Non-life insurance 2,637 49.20 3.82 42.09 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.80 9.91 0.89 0.09 40.52 1.76 -0.13 
(18.82) (0.39) (11.02) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.40) (9.07) (0.20) (0.29) (0.97) (0.76) (-0.44) 
General public administration 
activities 4,563 
44.42 3.70 45.36 0.48 0.60 0.42 0.52 0.91 10.71 0.80 0.14 311.69 0.02 -0.41 
(17.24) (0.52) (10.74) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.29) (9.53) (0.28) (0.35) (6.54) (0.00) (-0.36) 
Gambling and betting 
activities 153 
38.96 3.59 41.83 0.61 0.50 0.31 0.52 0.45 7.51 0.89 0.12 2.69 0.77 0.42 
(16.01) (0.40) (10.35) (0.49) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (5.41) (0.20) (0.33) (0.06) (0.05) (-0.41) 
Organization and operation of 
sport facilities for indoor and 
outdoor sports events 
502 
34.03 3.40 44.03 0.50 0.53 0.27 0.57 0.70 7.63 0.72 0.11 3.69 0.24 -0.49 
(15.83) (0.66) (12.42) (0.50) (0.50) (0.44) (0.50) (0.46) (8.20) (0.34) (0.32) (0.13) (0.01) (-0.40) 
Fitness facilities 399 30.76 3.29 40.82 0.28 0.58 0.28 0.62 0.67 6.06 0.54 0.19 4.61 0.15 -0.35 
(16.32) (0.56) (11.22) (0.45) (0.49) (0.45) (0.49) (0.47) (6.72) (0.34) (0.39) (0.38) (0.00) (-0.38) 
Source: Weighed data from the SLFS, years 2010-2016 (wage and demographics), STATENT, years 2011-2016 (industry size, industry sales), Value Added Tax Statistics, years 2010-2016 (industry sales) 
and our own survey (perceived industry immorality). Notes: N=number of observations per industry in the SLFS dataset, Male in {0, 1}, Married in {0, 1}, Education high: higher vocational education 
and training or university/college, Education middle: apprenticeship, full-time vocational school, matura or pedagogical training, Education low (reference category): compulsory schooling or pre-
vocational education, Swiss in {0, 1}, Experience = number of years in the firm, Full-time equivalent = (working hours /42), set to 1 for working hours >= 42, managerial duties in {0, 1}, Industry size = 
number employees in this industry / 1000 (2010 data is not available, we substitute it with 2011 data), Industry sales = Industry sales/number employees in this industry, Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] 
where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
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Table A2: Perceived immorality of firms 
Firms Perceived immorality I(j) Firms 
Perceived 
immorality I(j) 
Marlboro 0.54 Swisscom -0.07 
Monsanto 0.52 Firmenich -0.09 
Glencore 0.46 Winterthur Assurance -0.1 
Philip Morris 0.46 Swiss Life -0.13 
Nestlé 0.39 Swatch -0.17 
Tamoil 0.37 Adecco -0.18 
Syngenta 0.23 ABB -0.2 
UBS 0.19 Migros -0.38 
Novartis 0.18 WWF -0.66 
Credit Suisse 0.17 Pro Juventute -0.66 
Roche 0.13 Pro Natura -0.67 
Holcim 0.03 UNICEF -0.72 
Ernst and Young -0.05 Red cross -0.81 
Source: own survey. 
Notes: Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. 
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Table A3: Distribution of behavior regarding the behavioral measure of concern for 
morality 
Number of lies 
Reported number 
for state r: Expected 
payoff lying Frequency Share Classification 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 (Honest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 161 0.671 High-theta 
1 
6 2 3 4 5 6 0.83 6 
0.038 Low-theta 
2 2 3 4 5 6 0.17 3 
2 
6 6 3 4 5 6 1.5 12 
0.104 Low-theta 
1 2 3 6 6 6 0.5 2 
1 3 3 5 5 6 0.33 1 
1 4 4 4 5 6 0.5 1 
5 6 3 4 5 6 1.33 2 
6 5 3 4 5 6 1.33 1 
3 2 3 5 5 6 0.5 1 
3 3 3 4 5 6 0.5 5 
3 
6 6 6 4 5 6 2 11 
0.050 Low-theta 
4 2 3 6 6 6 1 1 
4 
6 6 6 6 5 6 2.33 3 
0.017 Low-theta 
6 5 5 5 5 6 1.83 1 
5 
6 6 6 6 6 6 2.5 15 
0.067 Low-theta 
2 3 4 5 6 6 0.83 1 
Lied in a  
self-harmful 
manner 
1 2 3 4 3 3 -0.83 1 
0.054 High-theta 
1 2 3 4 4 4 -0.5 1 
1 2 3 4 5 5 -0.17 1 
1 3 2 5 4 6 0 1 
1 4 2 4 5 6 0.17 1 
1 4 6 3 5 6 0.67 1 
2 1 3 4 5 6 0 1 
3 4 5 4 6 2 0.5 1 
5 1 3 6 4 2 0 1 
5 2 3 4 1 6 0 1 
5 4 6 4 6 5 1.5 1 
6 2 5 5 1 3 0.17 1 
6 6 6 6 6 5 2.33 1 
Notes: Expected payoff from lying = !
!
𝑚!" − 𝑟!!!! , where 𝑚!" is the number that individual 𝑖 reports if the actual 
die roll is 𝑟.  	
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	 			(1)	 			(2)	 			(3)	
Low-theta (𝜽𝑳
𝑬𝒙𝒑) 0.925*** -0.362  -0.060 (4.64) (-0.99)  (-0.39) 
Period (t) -0.019** -0.047  -0.050*** (-2.40) (-1.64)  (-5.74) 
Period * 𝜽𝑳
𝑬𝒙𝒑 0.012 -0.015  0.005 (1.14) (-0.40)  (0.54) 
Constant 0.449*** 4.425***  3.312*** (3.86) (14.76)  (25.63) 
Sigma  2.630***  0.571***  (7.69)  (10.58) 
Condition Immoral work Immoral work  Neutral work 
N 2520 1755  1077 
LL (pseudo) -1424.0 -4187.4  -924.3 
 p-value: t + t* 𝜽𝑳
𝑬𝒙𝒑= 0 0.422 0.001  0.0000 
Notes: Estimates from Craggs double-hurdle model: (1) is a probit model; (2) and (3) are truncated linear 
regressions (truncated from above at 50 CHF). Models (1) and (2) use only data from the immoral work condition; 
model (3) uses only data from the neutral work condition. For neutral work, we do not report the regression of 
market participation as we have only 3 incidences where a subject did not participate. Independent variables: Low-
theta in {0, 1}, Period between 1 and 15. Standard errors clustered at market level; z-statistics in parentheses; * - p 




Table A5: Relationship between the behavioral measures of concern for morality and 
outcomes in the experimental labor markets, robustness	
Dependent 
variable: Employment rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of lies         
     1 lie 
0.201 0.128   0.004 -0.008   
(1.05) (0.53)   (0.11) (-0.12)      
     2 lies 0.220** 0.182   -0.011 -0.049   
(2.17) (1.39)   (-0.21) (-0.84)      
     3 lies 
0.398*** 0.351***   -0.296*** -0.326***   
(5.29) (3.57)   (-12.89) (-15.52)      
     4 lies 
0.392*** 0.279**   0.171*** 0.167***   
(4.94) (2.61)   (7.43) (7.18)   
     5 lies 
0.286*** 0.233**   0.037 0.018   
(3.26) (2.48)   (0.49) (0.17)   
     self-harmful 
     lies 
0.252** 0.182   -0.0516 -0.001   
(2.53) (1.37)   (-1.25) (-0.04)     
Expected payoff  









Constant 0.475*** 0.517*** 0.510*** 0.512*** 0.829*** 0.806*** 0.824*** 0.801*** 
(11.6) (32.97) (13.79) (37.01) (36.11) (35.35) (35.65) (36.06) 
Condition Immoral Immoral Immoral Immoral Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral 
N 168 168 168 168 72 72 72 72 
R2 0.121 0.263 0.0752 0.238 0.085 0.250 0.001 0.162 
Market FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Models (1)-(4) use only data from the immoral work 
condition, models (5)-(8) use only data from the neutral work condition. Expected payoff from lying = !
!
𝑚!" −!!!!
𝑟 (∈ −2.5,2.5 ), where 𝑚!" is the number that individual 𝑖 reports if the actual die roll is 𝑟.  Standard errors 
clustered at market level; t-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
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Table A6: Relationship between 𝜽𝐄𝐱𝐩 and market income, depending on the behavior of 
other market participants	
Dependent variable: Market income 
Low-theta (𝜽𝑳
𝑬𝒙𝒑) -3.679 (-1.05) 




𝑬𝒙𝒑 * Many 𝜽H types 
16.348*** 
(3.53) 
Constant 18.046*** (11.61) 
N 168 
R2 0.089 
p-value: Many 𝜽H types +    
   𝜽𝑳
𝑬𝒙𝒑 * Many 𝜽H types=0 
0.0002 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Sample incudes only subjects from the immoral work 
condition. Low-theta in {0, 1}, Many 𝜃H types: 0=number of (other) low-theta type workers is lower than 2, 
1=number of (other) low-theta type workers is 2 or more. Standard errors clustered at market level; t-statistics in 
parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01.  
	













1 = the person finds that the behavior of a banker who recommends sub-
optimal assets to his clients because he has larger margins on them is: 
very outrageous, very blameworthy, very immoral, not at all acceptable 






































(0.13) 1 = the person’s attitude towards charities is very positive.	
Notes: Each subscale is constructed by taking averages over all items of the scale, and then normalized such that it 
lies between 0 and 1.   
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Table A8: Relationship between 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓 and outcomes in the experimental labor market		
Dependent variable: Employment rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type survey (𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓) -0.008 0.036 0.104 0.150 0.0103 0.015 (-0.06) (0.22) (0.45) (0.75) (0.06) (0.06) 
Immoral work (IW) -0.046  0.013  0.133  (-0.37)  (0.07)   (0.59)  
𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓 * IW -0.431 -0.366 -0.558 -0.537 -0.648* -0.505 (-1.64) (-1.14)  (-1.53) (-1.26) (-1.69) (-1.05) 











N 237 237 237 237 237 237 
R2 0.137 0.294 0.132 0.291 0.133 0.293 
p-value: 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓+ 𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓*Im = 0 0.0569 0.237 0.0924 0.311 0.0708 0.252 
Market FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Models differ in how we construct 𝜃!"#  from the nine 
psychological survey measures. Columns (1) and (2) report our main results, using factor analysis to aggregate the 
psychological measures. Columns (3) and (4) give the result if equal weight is given to each measure instead. 
Columns (5) and (6) give the results if weights are determined by a regression of the survey measures on 𝜃!"#. 
Other independent variables: Immoral work is in {0, 1}, 𝜃!"# is in [0,1], where higher numbers indicate more 





Table A9: Relationship between participation decision/reservation wage and 𝜽𝐒𝐮𝐫 (Hurdle 
model) in the immoral work condition	
Dependent 
variable: Participate  
Reservation 
wage Participate  
Reservation 
wage Participate  
Reservation 
wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type survey (𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓) -1.614** 0.432 -1.971** 0.571 -2.177** 0.373 (-2.44) (0.60) (-2.08) (0.61) (-2.13) (0.33) 
Constant 1.326*** 3.674*** 1.806*** 3.515*** 1.841*** 3.657*** (3.98) (10.39) (2.99) (6.12) (3.01) (5.25) 
Sigma  2.679***  2.679***  2.680***  (7.71)  (7.72)  (7.70) 











N 2475 1711 2475 1711 2475 1711 
LL (pseudo) -1478.3 -4114.1 -1488.2 -4114.2 -1490.9 -4114.6 
Notes: Estimates from Craggs double-hurdle model: Regressions (1), (3) and (5) are probit models, 
regressions (2), (4) and (6) are truncated linear regressions (truncated from above at 50 CHF). Regressions 
differ in how 𝜃!"# is constructed from the nine psychological survey measures. Columns (1) and (2) report 
our main results, using factor analysis to aggregate the psychological measures. Columns (3) and (4) give the 
result if equal weight is given to each measure instead. Columns (5) and (6) give the results if weights are 
determined by a regression of the survey measures on 𝜃!"#. 𝜃!"# is in [0,1], where higher numbers indicate 
more morality. Sample incudes only subjects from the immoral work condition. (In the neutral work condition, 
the coefficient of 𝜃!"# is not significant for any of the above specifications.) Standard errors clustered at 




Table A10: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on perceived 
immorality and moral types, robustness checks aggregation 𝜽𝐒𝐮𝐫 
Dependent variable: Willingness to work for industry j Willingness to work for firm j 

































































N 4715 4715 4715 4715 5064 5064 5064 5064 
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Observations where subjects did not know the firm (“I 
don’t know this organization”) or did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Independent variables: Models 
differ in how we construct 𝜃!"#  from the nine psychological survey measures. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) give the 
result if equal weight is given to each measure. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) give the results if weights are 
determined by a regression of the survey measures on 𝜃!
!"#. 𝜃!"# is in [0,1] where higher numbers indicate more 
morality. Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 0.5 means 
indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 
0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Control variables: age, gender, Swiss nationality, subject of study, 
average wage industry 2016 (SLFS; only for industries), industry size 2016 (STATENT; only for industries), 
industry sales 2015 (Value Added Tax Statistics; only for industries). Standard errors clustered at individual and 
industry/firm level (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2011); z-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p 
< 0.01. 
Table A11: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on perceived 
immorality and moral types, robustness checks classification firms immorality 
Dependent variable: Willingness to work for firm j 











Type survey (𝜽𝑺𝒖𝒓) -0.184** (-2.42) 
-0.222*** 
(-2.99)   




(-9.10)   
Type experiment 










N 5064 5064 5064 5064 
Control variables No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Perceived immorality is calculated different then in our 
main analysis: Clients that choose “I don’t know this organization” are classified as giving neutral ratings. 
Dependent variable:  Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 0.5 
means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Observations where subjects did not know the firm (“I 
don’t know this organization”) or did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Independent variables: (1) and (2) 
use  𝜃!"# (in [0,1]), while (3) and (4) use 𝜃!"# to classify participants, where 𝜃!"#=0 for low-theta types and 
𝜃!"#=1 for high-theta types. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 
means very immoral. Control variables: age, gender, Swiss nationality, subject of study. Standard errors clustered 
at individual and industry/firm level (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2011); z-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** 
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A12: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on perceived 
immorality and moral types, robustness checks “I don’t know this organization” 
Dependent variable: Willingness to work for firm j 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Perceived  























(-1.15)     






(-5.46)     
Type experiment  
















N 6162 6162 1352 1352 6162 6162 1352 1352 
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable:  Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 
0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to 
work. Observations where subjects did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6): 
Observations where subjects did not know the firm (“I don’t know this organization”) are classified as having 
willingness to work of 0.5. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8): only participants that did know all firms (N=52) are 
included. Independent variables: (1) - (4) use  𝜃!"# (in [0,1]), while (5) - (8) use 𝜃!"# to classify participants, where 
𝜃!"#=0 for low- theta types and 𝜃!"#=1 for high-theta types. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means 
very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Control variables: age, gender, Swiss nationality, subject of 
study. Standard errors clustered at individual and industry/firm level (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2011); z-
statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table A13: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on 
employment rate in the immoral work condition  
Dependent variable: Willingness to 
work for industry j 
Willingness to 
work for firm j 

























N 3275 3275 3561 3561 
Control variables No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Sample incudes only subjects from the immoral work 
condition. Dependent variable:  Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to 
work, 0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Observations where subjects did not know the 
firm (“I don’t know this organization”) or did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Independent variables: 
Employment rate is the share of market periods in which the worker was employed. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 
1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Control variables: age, gender, Swiss 
nationality, subject of study, average wage industry 2016 (SLFS; only for industries), industry size 2016 (STATENT; 
only for industries), industry sales 2015 (Value Added Tax Statistics; only for industries). Standard errors clustered 
at individual and industry/firm level (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2011); z-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** 
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.	
  
	 55	
Appendix B – Robustness checks for analysis using Swiss Labor Force Survey 
A potential critique of our analysis of wage premiums using the Swiss Labor Force 
Survey data in Section 4 is that we selected the potential immoral industries and the control 
industries ourselves. In this Appendix, we report results from two robustness checks that address 
this issue.  
 
1) We use all industries in the Swiss Labor Force survey as control industries 
In a first robustness check, we use all non-immoral industries in the Swiss Labor Force 
survey as control industries. We do not have a measure of the perceived industry immorality, I(j), 
for most industries. Instead of relying on such a measure, we define a set of industries as 
“immoral industries” and calculate wage premiums (or, wage discounts) for these industries, 
controlling for worker, job and industry characteristics. This approach is commonly used in the 
literature that studies stock returns for “sin industries” (e.g., Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant, 2008; 
Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Blitz and Fabozzi, 2017; Colonnello, Curatola and Gioffré, 2019). 
We expect immoral industries to pay a positive wage premium, a compensating differential for 
the immoral nature of the work. 
Set of immoral industries: We select the set of immoral industries based on the industry 
ratings. Most participants that rated the immorality of the industries agreed that it is immoral to 
work in the following four industries: manufacture of weapons and ammunitions, manufacture of 
tobacco products, wholesale of tobacco products and gambling and betting activities (see Table 
A1). These four industries are also typically considered to be “sin industries” in the literature on 
sin stocks. We focus on these four industries.39 Given that we use the industry ratings to select 
the immoral industries, this robustness check still depends on our selection of potentially 
immoral industries in Section 4. Note, however, that we use the entire dataset as control 
industries and therefore do not rely on our selection of control industries.  
Results: Figure B1 (i) shows the average gross hourly wages for each of the four immoral 
industries and the average wage in all other industries. Table B1 reports regressions of the 
																																								 																				
39 In Section 4, we select two other industries, monetary intermediations and credit granting, that might potentially 
be perceived as immoral. As there was disagreement on the immorality of these two industries among survey 
respondents (see Table A1), we do not include them in the set of immoral industries. Note, however, that both 
industries pay substantial wage premiums. If we add dummies for working in these industries to Model 3, 
coefficients are 0.263 (t=11.12, p<0.001) for monetary intermediation and 0.282 (t=20.51, p<0.001) for credit 
granting. 
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natural logarithm of real gross hourly wages on the dummies for working in each of the four 
immoral industries, along with several additional control variables (Model 1, 2 and 3). All four 
immoral industries pay substantial wage premiums, in line with an immorality premium for 
immoral work. According to Model 3, individuals working in the immoral industries have 
(geometric) mean hourly earnings of between 12 percent and 29 percent higher than people 
working in other industries. 
 
2) We elicited perceived industry immorality for a second set of industries 
As a second robustness check, we elicit the perceived industry immorality for a second 
set of industries, but in this case we do not select the industries. Instead, we ask research 
assistants unaware of our hypotheses to select moral and immoral industries. We then provide 
evidence for an immorality premium in this second set of industries.  
Set of industries: We created a list with all industries that had at least 50 observations in 
the Swiss Labor Force Survey. This resulted in a list of 394 industries. We then asked five 
research assistants to select up to ten industries in which they think it is most immoral to work 
and up to ten industries in which they think it is most moral to work. They ranked the selected 
industries from most immoral (moral) to least immoral (moral). The research assistants were 
unaware of our research question. The five industries that the research assistants thought to be 
the most immoral and the five industries that they thought to be the most moral are included in 
the set of industries used in this robustness test.40 In addition to these ten industries, we randomly 
selected a set of 40 other industries that had at least 50 observations in the Swiss Labor Force 
Survey. Table B2 gives all selected industries. 
Industry ratings: We elicited a measure of perceived immorality for the set of 50 
industries. We recruited 45 participants drawn from the same subject pool from which we recruit 
participants for our laboratory experiment (but that did not participate in our experiment). These 
participants rated how immoral they think it is to work for each of the 50 industries on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from very immoral to very moral. We re-scaled the responses to lie on the -1 
to 1 interval. Table B2 gives the ratings for all industries. 
																																								 																				
40 We calculated the average rank of each industry as follows. We first allocated points to each industry according to 
its rank: if an in industry was rated the most immoral industry it received 10 points, the second most immoral 
industry received 9 points, and so on. We then added up points for every industry and selected the five immoral and 
the five moral industries with the highest number of points. 
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Results: Figure B1 (ii) shows the correlation between average industry wages and the 
new collected measure of perceived industry immorality. Table B1 reports regressions of the 
natural logarithm of real gross hourly wages on the new collected measure of perceived industry 
immorality, along with several additional control variables (Model 4 to 6).41 We find a 
substantial and statistically significant immorality wage premium. According to Model 6, 
individuals working in an industry as immoral as manufacture of weapons and ammunition (i.e., 
Perceived immorality = 0.47) have (geometric) mean hourly earnings approximately 17 percent 
higher than people working in an industry with the median industry immorality rating (i.e., 
Perceived immorality = -0.14).42 
Figure B1: Correlation between wages and perceived industry immorality, robustness 
  
(i) All industries as control industries   (ii) Second set of industries 
Source: Weighted data from the SLFS, years 2010-2016 (wage) and our own survey for the second set of industries 
(panel (ii), perceived industry immorality). Notes: Real gross hourly wage in 2010 CHF. Panel (i) gives the average 
gross hourly wages for Manufacture weapons and ammunitions (Weapons (manuf.)), manufacture tobacco (Tobacco 
(manuf.)), Wholesale tobacco (Tobacco (wholes.)), Gambling and betting and all other industries. N = 239,313. 
Panel (ii) gives the correlation between average industry wages and perceived industry immorality. Perceived 
immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. The numbers in the 
figure give the industry code of each dot (see Table B2). N = 47,935.  
  
																																								 																				
41 Numbers of observations differ substantially between industries. If we weight observations by industry size 
(instead of using survey weights), estimates for perceived immorality are similar (Model 4: 0.342, Model 5: 0.281, 
Model 6: 0.266) and statistically significant (t=2.83, t=3.21,t=3.39, respectively).  








































































































Table B1: Relationship between wages and industry immorality, robustness 
Dependent variable: ln of real gross hourly wage (in 2010 CHF)    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Manufacture weapons and  






(8.24)    




(9.16)    
Wholesale tobacco 0.402*** (17.47) 
0.327***   
(23.49) 
0.280*** 
(16.29)    




(9.44)    
Perceived industry  



























































































N 239,313 236,625 236,625 47,935 47,935 47,935 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.206 0.221 0.041 0.248 0.263 
Year and Region FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Source: Weighed data from the SLFS, years 2010-2016 (wage and demographics), STATENT, years 2011-2016 (industry size, 
industry sales), Value Added Tax Statistics, years 2010-2016 (industry sales) and our own online-survey (perceived industry 
immorality). Notes: Manufacture weapons and ammunitions, Manufacture tobacco, Wholesale tobacco and Gambling and 
betting are binary variables where 1 means that the individual works in the respective industry. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] 
where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Control variables: Male in {0, 1}, Married in {0, 1}, 
Education high: higher vocational education and training or university/college, Education middle: apprenticeship, full-time 
vocational school, matura or pedagogical training, Education low (reference category): compulsory schooling or pre-vocational 
education, Swiss in {0, 1}, Experience = number of years in the firm, Full-time equivalent = (working hours /42), set to 1 for 
working hours >= 42, managerial duties in {0, 1}, Industry size = number employees in this industry / 1000 (2010 data is not 
available, we substitute it with 2011 data), Industry sales = Industry sales/number employees in this industry. Model 3 and 6 
control for company region fixed effects (26 Swiss cantons) and year fixed effects (2010-2016). Standard errors clustered at the 
industry level, t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.   
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Manufacture of weapons and ammunition 2540 0.60 
Wholesale of tobacco products 4635 0.54 
Processing and preserving of meat (except poultry meat) 1011 0.24 
Credit granting 6492 0.23 
Processing and preserving of poultry meat 1012 0.24 
 
Moral industries 
Social work activities without accommodation for the elderly and 
disabled 8810 -0.46 
Residential care activities for the elderly and disabled 8730 -0.70 
Fire service activities 8425 -0.73 
Primary education 8520 -0.78 
Hospital activities 8610 -0.64 
 
Other Industries 
Manufacture of prepared meals and dishes 1085 -0.03 
Wholesale of office machinery and equipment, except computers 
and computer peripheral equipment 4666 -0.09 
Publishing of newspapers 5813 -0.25 
Monetary intermediation (cantonal banks, commercial banks, 
stock exchange banks, private bankers; banks with a special field 
of business; regional banks; Raiffeisen banks; Foreign-controlled 
banks) 
6419 0.14 
Passenger rail transport 4910 -0.36 
Support activities for crop production (preparation of fields; 
establishing a crop; treatment of crops; crop spraying; trimming of 
fruit trees and vines; transplanting of rice; thinning of beets; 
harvesting; pest control; provision of agricultural machinery with 
operators and crew) 
1610 -0.26 
Driving school 8553 -0.21 
Security and commodity contracts brokerage 6612 -0.01 
Printing of newspapers 1811 -0.2 
Growing of other non-perennial crops (growing of swedes, 
mangolds, fodder roots, clover, alfalfa, sainfoin, fodder maize and 
other grasses; buckwheat; potted and bedding plants; beet seeds 
(excluding sugar beet seeds); seeds of forage plants and flower 
seeds; forage kale and similar forage products; production of cut 
flowers) 
119 -0.26 
Plant propagation 130 -0.24 
Packaging activities (bottling of liquids; packaging of solids; 
security packaging of pharmaceutical preparations; labelling, 
stamping and imprinting; parcel-packing and gift-wrapping) 
8292 -0.03 
Manufacture of fasteners and screw machine products 2594 -0.14 
Construction of residential and non-residential buildings 4120 -0.15 
Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather 
production 2894 0.06 
General medical practice activities 8621 -0.58 
Activities of holding companies 6420 0.11 










Retail sale of electrical household appliances in specialised stores 4754 -0.19 
Wholesale trade of motor vehicle parts and accessories 4531 -0.01 
Wholesale of flowers and plants 4622 -0.24 
Dispensing chemist in specialised stores 4773 -0.19 
Administration of financial markets 6611 0.10 
Manufacture of other food products (soups and broths; artificial 
honey and caramel; perishable prepared foods; food supplements; 
yeast; extracts and juices; non-dairy milk and cheese substitutes; 
egg products; artificial concentrates) 
1089 -0.16 
Other personal service activities (astrological and spiritualists' 
activities; social activities; pet care services; genealogical 
organisations; tattooing and piercing studios; shoe shiners; 
porters; valet car parkers; concession operation of coin-operated 
personal service machines) 
9609 -0.18 
Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 2620 -0.07 
Joinery installation 4332 -0.19 
Wholesale of beverages 4634 -0.08 
Camping grounds, recreational vehicle parks and trailer parks 5530 -0.28 
Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 2670 -0.21 
Renting and leasing of cars and light motor vehicles 7711 -0.04 
Wholesale of other machinery and equipment (transport 
equipment except motor vehicles; production-line robots; wires 
and switches; other electrical material; machinery for use in trade, 
navigation and  industry [except mining, construction, civil 
engineering and textile industry]; measuring instruments and 
equipment) 
4669 -0.10 
Non-specialised wholesale trade 4690 -0.09 
Mixed Farming 150 -0.17 
Manufacture of electric domestic appliances 2751 -0.07 
Life insurance 6511 0.06 
Manufacture and processing of other glass, including technical 
glassware (laboratory, hygienic or pharmaceutical glassware; 
clock or watch glasses, optical glass and optical elements not 
optically worked; glassware used in imitation jewellery; glass 
insulators and glass insulating fittings; glass envelopes for lamps; 
glass figurines; glass paving blocks; glass in rods or tubes) 
2319 -0.17 
Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods 4646 0.01 
Taxi operation 4932 -0.14 
Child day-care activities 8891 -0.69 
Manufacture of rusks and biscuits; manufacture of preserved 
pastry goods and cakes 1072 -0.11 
Notes: Immoral (Moral) industries are the industries that the research assistants selected as the most immoral 
(moral) industries. Other industries are 40 randomly selected industries that have at least 50 observations in the 
Swiss Labor Force Survey.  
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Appendix C – Welfare measure 
In the model, accepting an immoral job has “moral costs,” 𝜃! ∗ 𝐼(𝑗). According to 
Proposition 3, the types with the lowest moral concerns nevertheless benefit from an increase in 
immorality because the increase of the market wage exceeds the increase of these moral costs. In 
the analysis in Section 5, we focused on subjects’ market incomes, thereby ignoring these costs. 
The market mechanism that we apply allows us to measure subjects’ moral costs. In the 
following, we account for moral costs and reconsider whether the predictions of our model 
(Proposition 3 and 4) are in line with the data. 
In the experimental labor markets, subjects submit reservation wages. The differences 
between reservation wages and induced costs measure individuals’ moral costs (together with 
potential real effort costs, though the reservation wages in the neutral work condition suggest 
that these are minimal). The difference between the market wage and the reservation wage is 
then a subject’s benefits from market participation. Based on this reasoning, we calculate the 
following welfare measure for each participant i:  
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒! = 𝟏 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 < 𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 ∗ (𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 − 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 )
!"
!!!




where 𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟  is the market wage in round r in the market of individual i, 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟  is individual 
i’s wage request for the doing a first job in round r, 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟  is individual i’s wage request for 
doing the second job in round r and 𝟏 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 < 𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟  measures whether individual i is hired 
for job j (first or second job) in round r. 
Table C1, columns (1) and (2) presents evidence in support of Proposition 3: in the 
immoral work condition, the low-theta types have a CHF 7.05 higher welfare than the high-theta 
types (p=0.007). In the neutral work condition, the difference between types is very small (and 
even in the opposite direction).  
However, this welfare measure has two potential shortcomings:  
i) In the uniform-price sealed-offer auction, workers have incentives to submit their 
true reservation wage for the first job (Smith et al., 1982). For the second job, 
however, participants can have incentives to overstate their wage request. As a 
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result, the second wage requests should be interpreted as upper bounds of subjects’ 
true reservation wages, and, as a result, the welfare measures should be interpreted 
as a lower bound of the “true” welfare. 
ii) If some subjects do not understand the market mechanism, they might make errors 
in reporting their reservation wages.  
We address this issue in Table C1, columns (3) – (6). First, we replicate the analysis for 
the welfare generated trough the first job only, for which elicitation is incentive compatible. That 
is, we look at 𝟏 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 < 𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 ∗ (𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 − 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 )!"!!! . Table C1, columns (3) and (4) 
provide the estimates for this second welfare measure. We again find support for Proposition 3. 
In columns (5) and (6), we look at the welfare generated in the last five market periods only, that 
is, 𝟏 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 < 𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 ∗ (𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 − 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 )!"!!!! + 𝟏 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 < 𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 ∗!"!!!!
(𝑤 𝑖, 𝑟 − 𝑤! 𝑖, 𝑟 ). Subjects already participated in 10 market rounds, which gave them time to 
learn how the market works. We again find support for Proposition 3. (Given that the dependent 
variable only aggregates welfare from 5 periods, effect sizes are, if anything, bigger than in the 
other specifications.) 
We also have a second welfare measure: subjects’ self-report happiness, which we elicit 
after the final market period. We do not find a statistically significant difference in happiness 
between the types in both treatment conditions (see Table C1, columns (7) and (8)). 
Table C1: Relationship between 𝜽𝐄𝐱𝐩 and welfare	
Dependent 
variable: Welfare Welfare, first job 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Low-theta (𝜽𝑳









































N 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 




𝑬𝒙𝒑*IW=0 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.719 0.670 
Market FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Independent variables: Low-theta in {0, 1}, Immoral work 




According to Proposition 4, the least moral types benefit from the presence of more 
moral types in immoral labor markets. Table C2 replicates the analysis from Section 5 for all 
welfare measures. We find support for Proposition 4. However, there is no effect of the type-
composition of the market on self-reported happiness.  
Table C2: Relationship between 𝜽𝐄𝐱𝐩 and welfare, depending on the behavior of other 
market participants	









































N 168 168 168 168 
R2 0.072 0.090 0.077 0.007 
p-value: Many 𝜽H 
types + 𝜽𝑳
𝑬𝒙𝒑 * Many 
𝜽H types=0 
0.0068 0.0086 0.0221 0.2969 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Sample incudes only subjects from the immoral work 
condition. Low-theta in {0, 1}, Many θH types: 0=number of (other) low-theta type workers is lower than 2, 
1=number of (other) low-theta type workers is 2 or more. Standard errors clustered at market level; t-statistics in 




Appendix D – A simple model of heterogeneous moral concern in labor 
markets  
In this section, we introduce a simple stylized model of labor markets with varying 
degrees of perceived job immorality and heterogeneity in concern for moral behavior among 
workers.  
We examine a single labor market for a job, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, which might involve doing immoral 
work. Firms decide whether to hire a worker to do 𝑗 at the market wage, w, and workers decide 
whether to accept work 𝑗 for the market wage. Workers differ in their concerns for morality. We 
investigate how the equilibrium wage and selection in this labor market change with the 
immorality of 𝑗. Our framework is a simplification of the theoretical literature on compensating 
wage differentials (see, e.g., Rosen, 1986).43 We do not seek to expand this literature, but rather 
to apply it to a context in which the relevant job dimension is immorality. 
The immorality of 𝑗 is measured by a function 𝐼: 𝐽 → [0,∞), where 𝐼(𝑗!) > 𝐼(𝑗) means 
that job 𝑗′ is more immoral than job 𝑗, and 𝐼(𝑗) = 0 means that 𝑗 involves no immoral acts. The 
set of immoral jobs is 𝐽!" = {𝑗 ∈ 𝐽: 𝐼(𝑗) > 0}. 
Labor demand is represented by an interval of firms, 𝑘 ∈ [0,1]. Firms’ behavior is given 
by the labor demand function, 𝐷:ℝ × 𝐽 → [0,1], with 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗) = 0, 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗) = 1 for 
𝑤 ≤ 0, 𝐷 continuous in 𝑤 and 𝐷 strictly decreasing in 𝑤 on [0,∞). In addition, we assume that 
an increase in the immorality of the job does not decrease the profitability of employing labor, 
that is, 𝐼 𝑗′ > 𝐼(𝑗) implies 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗′ ≥ 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗  for all 𝑤.44 
Labor supply consists of an interval of workers, 𝑖 ∈ [0,1]. Each worker has reservation 
utility 𝑢 ≥ 0, and the utility of accepting job 𝑗 for a worker of type 𝑖 is given by:45 
𝑢!
!""#$% 𝑗,𝑤 = 𝑤 − 𝑐 − 𝜃! ∗ 𝐼(𝑗), 
																																								 																				
43 Unlike most models of compensating wage differentials, we do not have multiple labor markets, rather one and a 
fixed outside option. In our laboratory experiment, we also assign subjects to one labor market. This abstraction 
simplifies both the theory and the experiment. However, we show in Appendix E that the model allows for an 
interpretation with two jobs, an immoral job and a neutral job. Our results also apply to such a context. 
44 In our experiment, we vary the immorality of the job, but fix labor demand, that is, 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗′ = 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗  for all 𝑤 
and all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽. If an increase in immorality were to decrease profitability, there would be no incentives for firms to 
operate in immoral industries. Heidhues, Kőszegi and Murooka (2017) provide a basis for why deceptively marketed 
socially harmful products may be more profitable in the presence of naïve consumers. In Appendix E, we provide a 
behavioral foundation for the labor demand. 
45 Models about “mission-oriented” employees commonly assume very similar additive utility functions (e.g. Cassar 
and Meier, 2018), with the main difference that −𝐼 𝑗 ∗ 𝜃! is replaced by a positive term, the “meaningfulness of 
work” multiplied by how much the individual cares about meaning. 
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where 𝑐 ≥ 0 is the worker’s cost of effort, which is independent of 𝑗.  The parameter 𝜃! ≥ 0 
measures the worker’s aversion to immoral work and is distributed according to a cumulative 
density function 𝐹 ∈ ℱ!. The set ℱ!	 consists of all density functions 𝐹 that are continuous, 
strictly increasing on [0,∞), and with 𝐹(0) = 0, meaning that no worker likes immoral work.46 
The indirect utility of a worker of type 𝑖 is then given by 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑢,𝑢!
!""#$%(𝑗,𝑤)}. 




 accepts the job. Labor supply is therefore 𝑆(𝑤, 𝑗) = 𝐹(!!!!!
!(!)
 ).47 
We next consider the equilibrium properties of this type of market. The equilibrium 
wage, 𝑤∗(𝑗), is implicitly defined by 𝑆(𝑤∗(𝑗), 𝑗)− 𝐷(𝑤∗(𝑗), 𝑗) = 0.48 The following Lemma 
states that for every 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, 𝑤∗(𝑗) exists and is unique. 
Lemma. For all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽!", 𝑤∗(𝑗) exists, is unique and is in (𝑢 + 𝑐,∞). For all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 ∖ 𝐽!", 
𝑤∗(𝑗) = 𝑢 + 𝑐. 
Proof. Suppose 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽!". Existence: Define 𝑓 𝑤, 𝑗 = 𝑆 𝑤, 𝑗 − 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗). Note that 𝑓 𝑢 + 𝑐, 𝑗 =
0− + < 0, 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑓 𝑤, 𝑗 = 1− 0 = 1 and 𝑓 𝑤, 𝑗  is continuous in 𝑤. By the intermediate 
value theorem there exists 𝑤∗(𝑗) ∈ (𝑢 + 𝑐,∞) such that 𝑓 𝑤∗(𝑗), 𝑗 = 0.  
Uniqueness: Follows from 𝑓 𝑤, 𝑗  being strictly increasing in 𝑤 on [0,∞).  
Suppose 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 ∖ 𝐽!".  Then, 𝑆 𝑤, 𝑗 =
0, 𝑤 < 𝑢 + 𝑐
0,1 , 𝑤 = 𝑢 + 𝑐
1, 𝑤 > 𝑢 + 𝑐
. Note that for any 𝑤 < 𝑢 + 𝑐 , we have 
𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗 > 0 but 𝑆 𝑤, 𝑗 = 0, and for any 𝑤 > 𝑢 + 𝑐 we have 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗 < 1, but 𝑆 𝑤, 𝑗 = 1. For 
𝑤 = 𝑢 + 𝑐, 𝑆 𝑤, 𝑗 = 0,1  and 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗 ∈ 0,1 , so 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 𝑤, 𝑗 . ∎ 
In the following, we derive four properties of labor markets with immoral jobs. While 
straightforward, we use these results to make predictions for our empirical work. In particular, 
the first two propositions derive the primary hypotheses that we test across all of our analysis.  
																																								 																				
46 Note that 𝐹(0) = 0 implies that no worker likes to do immoral jobs. 
47 The assumptions on 𝐹 (together with the properties of a cdf) imply that 𝑆 is continuous and strictly increasing in 
𝑤 on [𝑢 + 𝑐,∞), 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑆(𝑤, 𝑗) = 1, and 𝑆(𝑤, 𝑗) = 0  for all 𝑤 ≤ 𝑢 + 𝑐. 
48 Note that for 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 ∖ 𝐽!", 𝑆 is a correspondence. For this case, 𝑤∗(𝑗) is defined by 𝐷(𝑤∗ 𝑗 , 𝑗) ∈ 𝑆(𝑤∗(𝑗), 𝑗). 
Moreover, 𝑤∗(𝑗) depends on 𝐹. When necessary (Corollary, Proposition 4) we will make this explicit by writing 
𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐹) instead of 𝑤∗(𝑗). 
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Proposition 1 shows that there is an immorality premium for immoral jobs: an increase in 
the immorality of a job decreases supply and therefore increases the equilibrium wage. 
Proposition 1. (Immorality premium) For all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽 with 𝐼(𝑗) < 𝐼(𝑗!), 𝑤∗(𝑗) < 𝑤∗(𝑗′). 
Proof. 𝑤∗(𝑗) < 𝑤∗(𝑗′): Suppose 𝐼 𝑗 = 0. Then, 𝑤∗ 𝑗 = 𝑢 + 𝑐 and 𝑤∗ 𝑗! > 𝑢 + 𝑐 (see 
Lemma). Suppose 𝐼 𝑗 > 0. Suppose that 𝑤∗(𝑗) ≥ 𝑤∗(𝑗′). Then 𝑆 𝑤∗(𝑗), 𝑗 > 𝑆 𝑤∗(𝑗′), 𝑗′  and 
𝐷 𝑤∗ 𝑗 , 𝑗 ≤ 𝐷 𝑤∗ 𝑗! , 𝑗  because 𝐹 and −𝐷 are strictly increasing in 𝑤 on [0,∞), I(𝑗) < 𝐼(𝑗!) 
and therefore 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗!) ≥ 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗) for all 𝑤. So 𝑆 𝑤∗(𝑗), 𝑗 − 𝑆 𝑤∗ 𝑗! , 𝑗! + 𝐷 𝑤∗ 𝑗! , 𝑗′ −
𝐷 𝑤∗ 𝑗 , 𝑗 > 0, a contradiction to the definition of 𝑤∗(𝑗) and 𝑤∗(𝑗′). ∎ 
The following Corollary further shows that this wage premium will be insignificant if workers do 
not sufficiently care about morality.49  
Corollary. For all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽 with 𝐼(𝑗) < 𝐼(𝑗!) and 𝜀 > 0, there exists 𝐺 ∈ ℱ! such that  
𝑤∗ 𝑗!,𝐺 − 𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐺) ≤ 𝜀. 
Proof. Suppose that there exists a 𝐺 ∈ ℱ! such that  
𝐺
𝜀
𝐼 𝑗′  = 𝐷 u+ c+ ε, 𝑗′ . 
Then, w∗ j′,G = u+ c+ ε. The Lemma and Proposition 1 then imply that w∗ j,G ∈ [u+
c, u+ c+ ε), and, as a result, 𝑤∗ 𝑗!,𝐺 − 𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐺) ≤ 𝜀. 
To proof that such a 𝐺 ∈ ℱ! exist, take any 𝐻 ∈ ℱ! and construct 𝐺 as follows: 
𝐺 x =
0 𝑖𝑓 x < 0
𝑥
𝐼 𝑗′
𝜀 𝐷 u+ c+ ε, 𝑗′ 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ∈ [0,
𝜀
𝐼 𝑗′ ]
𝐷 u+ c+ ε, 𝑗′ + 1− 𝐷 u+ c+ ε, 𝑗′ 𝐻(𝑥 −
𝜀
𝐼 𝑗′




The assumptions on 𝐷 imply that 𝐷(u+ c+ ε, j′) ∈ (0,1). Note that 𝐺 is continuous, strictly 
increasing on [0,∞), and with 𝐺(0) = 0. Therefore 𝐺 ∈ ℱ!. ∎ 
																																								 																				
49 Becker (1957) made a very similar point in his analysis of discrimination: discrimination will only affect wages if 
there is sufficiently large share of discriminating employers. 
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Formally, the Corollary shows that there are distributions of moral types such that the wage 
differentials are arbitrary small.  
Second, the types that care least about the immorality of a job (𝜃! ≤
!∗(!)!!!!
!(!)
), sort into 
accepting immoral jobs, while those more concerned with morality (𝜃! >
!∗(!)!!!!
!(!)
), refuse to do 
the job for the equilibrium wage.50 This is formally shown in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2. (Sorting) For all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽!", worker 𝑖 is hired iff 𝜃! ≤
!∗ ! !!!!
! !
≡ 𝜃 𝑗 > 0.  
Proof. A worker accepts job 𝑗 iff 𝑢!




𝜃(𝑗) > 0: Follows from 𝑤∗(𝑗) > 𝑢 + 𝑐 (see Lemma). ∎ 
Proposition 2 is critical to the notion that immorality wage premiums are driven by those who 
find immoral work most distasteful opting out of such jobs. This important relationship has, to 
our knowledge, not been previously empirically tested. 
Our next two propositions are less central, but nevertheless provide some useful and 
testable insights into behavior in immoral labor markets. Proposition 3 shows that the most 
immoral types profit from an increase in the immorality of work. 
Proposition 3. For all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽 with 𝐼(𝑗) < 𝐼(𝑗!), there exists 𝜃 𝑗, 𝑗! > 0 such that 
𝑣!(𝑗′,𝑤∗(𝑗′)) > 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤∗(𝑗)) iff 𝜃! < 𝜃(𝑗, 𝑗′).  
Proof. Suppose 𝐼 𝑗 = 0. Then 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤∗(𝑗)) = 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑢 + 𝑐) = 𝑢 (see Lemma). Note that 
𝑢!
!""#$%(𝑗′,𝑤∗ 𝑗! ) > 𝑢 iff 𝜃! <
!∗ !! !!!!
! !!
= 𝜃(𝑗′), so 𝑣! 𝑗!,𝑤∗ 𝑗!  = 𝑢!
!""#$%(𝑗′,𝑤∗ 𝑗! ) >
𝑢 = 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤∗(𝑗)) iff  𝜃! < 𝜃(𝑗′) ≡ 𝜃(𝑗, 𝑗′). Note that 𝜃 𝑗, 𝑗! > 0 by Proposition 2.  
Suppose 𝐼 𝑗 > 0. Note that 𝑣! 𝑗!,𝑤∗ 𝑗! > 𝑣! 𝑗,𝑤∗ 𝑗 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑢!
!""#$%(𝑗,𝑤∗ 𝑗 ),𝑢  if and 
only if: 
i) 𝑢!
!""#$%(𝑗′,𝑤∗ 𝑗! ) > 𝑢!
!""#$%(𝑗,𝑤∗ 𝑗 )  
ii) 𝑢!
!""#$%(𝑗′,𝑤∗ 𝑗! ) > 𝑢 
																																								 																				
50 This perfect sorting according to 𝜃 is an extreme case. Heterogeneity in the costs of effort, reservation utility or 
productivity implies partial sorting according to 𝜃 (see Garen (1988) and Hwang, Reed and Hubbard (1992) for 
related examples). We incorporate only one dimension of heterogeneity in the model for simplicity.  
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Inequality i) holds iff 𝜃! <
!∗ !! !!∗(!)
! !! !!(!)
 and inequality ii) holds iff 𝜃! < 𝜃(𝑗′). Therefore, we have 
𝜃 𝑗, 𝑗! = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 !
∗ !! !!∗(!)
! !! !!(!)
,𝜃(𝑗′) . Note that 𝜃 𝑗, 𝑗! > 0 (see Proposition 1 and 
Proposition 2). ∎ 
More precisely, there are always some types who are sufficiently unconcerned with morality who 
are hired in a market for immoral work and are overcompensated by the immorality premium.  
Finally, Proposition 4 shows that moral behavior (refusing to do the immoral job) can 
have positive externalities for the most immoral types. If the distribution of types shifts toward 
more concern for morality—in the sense of stochastic dominance—then the supply at any given 
wage decreases, thereby increasing the equilibrium wage and the utility of those least concerned 
with morality. For instance, any completely immoral types (i.e., 𝜃! = 0) will always benefit from 
a higher wage produced by increased moral concerns.  
Proposition 4. For all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽!" and 𝐹,𝐺 ∈ ℱ! with F(𝑥) < 𝐺(𝑥) for all 𝑥 > 0, there exists 
𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 > 0 such that 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐹)) > 𝑣!(𝑗,𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐺))  iff 𝜃! < 𝜃(𝑗,𝐹).	
Proof. First, we will proof that 𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐺) ≤ 𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐹). Suppose not, then 𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 > 𝑤∗(𝑗,𝐹). But 
then 𝑆(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 , 𝑗,𝐺) > 𝑆(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 , 𝑗,𝐹) and 𝐷(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 , 𝑗) < 𝐷(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 , 𝑗) because 𝐹, 𝐺 and 
−𝐷 are strictly increasing in 𝑤 on [0,∞), and 𝐹 first-order stochastically dominates 𝐺. But then 
𝑆(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 , 𝑗,𝐺)− 𝑆(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 , 𝑗,𝐹)+ 𝐷(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 , 𝑗)− 𝐷(𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 , 𝑗) > 0, a contradiction to 
the definition of 𝑤∗.  
Second, define 𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 = !
∗(!,!)!!!!
!(!)
≡ 𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 , and note that under this definition 𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 −
𝑐 − 𝑆 𝑗 ∗ 𝜃! > 𝑢 iff 𝜃! < 𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 .  (𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 > 0 follows from Proposition 2.) 
To finish the proof, note that 𝑣! 𝑗,𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 = 𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 − 𝑐 − 𝐼 𝑗 ∗ 𝜃! > max 𝑢,𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺 −
𝑐 − 𝐼 𝑗 ∗ 𝜃! = 𝑣! 𝑗,𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺  for all 𝜃! < 𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 , and 𝑣! 𝑗,𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐹 = 𝑢 = 𝑣! 𝑗,𝑤∗ 𝑗,𝐺   
for all 𝜃! ≥ 𝜃 𝑗,𝐹 . ∎  
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Appendix E – Alternative model interpretation  
The results in Section 3 and Appendix D also apply for a context with 2 jobs, a neutral 
job 𝑗! (𝐼 𝑗! = 0) and an immoral job 𝑗!" ∈ 𝐽!" (𝐼(𝑗!") > 0). In the following, we show that, 
under some assumptions, labor demand and labor supply correspond to their counterparts in 
Appendix D. Therefore, all results derived in Appendix D also hold in the context with 2 jobs.  
Labor supply: Labor supply consists of an interval of workers, 𝑖 ∈ [0,1]. As in Appendix 
D, we assume that the utility of accepting job 𝑗 of a worker of type 𝑖 is given by: 
𝑢! 𝑗,𝑤 𝑗 = 𝑤 𝑗 − 𝑐 − 𝜃! ∗ 𝐼(𝑗), 
where the parameter 𝜃! is distributed according to a distribution with cdf, 𝐹 ∈ ℱ!. The set ℱ!	
consists of all density functions 𝐹 that are continuous, strictly increasing on [0,∞), and with 




 chooses the immoral job. The labor supply for the immoral job is then 
given by 𝑆(𝑤, 𝑗!") = 𝐹( !
!(!!")
 ), where 𝑤 = 𝑤(𝑗!")− 𝑤(𝑗!) is the immorality premium. Note 
that the labor supply for the immoral job corresponds to the labor supply in Appendix D with 
𝑢 = 𝑐 = 0.  
Labor demand: Labor demand consists of an interval of firms, 𝑘 ∈ [0,1]. Each firm can 
either produce a neutral product or an immoral product. Firms that produce immoral products 
offer immoral jobs; firms that produce neutral products offer neutral jobs. Firms’ profits are: 
𝜋! 𝑗,𝑤 = 𝑎! 𝑗 − 𝑤 𝑗 , 
where 𝑎!(𝑗) measures firm 𝑘’s earnings when producing good 𝑗. Firms choose to produce the 
immoral product if ∆𝑎!(𝑗!") = 𝑎! 𝑗!" − 𝑎! 𝑗! ≥ 𝑤. This term, ∆𝑎!(𝑗!"), is distributed 
according to a distribution with cdf 𝐺!!". An increase in immorality of the job does not decrease 
firms earnings,51 that is, i) 𝐺!(0) = 0 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽!", and ii) for all 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝐽!" with  𝐼 𝑗′ > 𝐼(𝑗), 
𝐺!!(𝑥) ≤ 𝐺!(𝑥) for all 𝑥 ∈ ℝ. In addition, 𝐺!!" is continuous and strictly increasing on [0,∞). 
The labor demand for the immoral job is then given by 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗!" = 1− 𝐺!!"(𝑤). Note that 𝐷 is 
																																								 																				
51 One interpretation is, for example, that 𝐼 𝑗  measures negative externalities in production. Avoiding these 
externalities is costly; decreasing the immorality therefore increases production costs (see also Rosen, 1986). 
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continuous in 𝑤, strictly decreasing in 𝑤 on [0,∞), with 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗!" = 0  and 
𝐷 𝑤, 𝑗!" = 1 for 𝑤 ≤ 0. In addition, 𝐼 𝑗′ > 𝐼(𝑗) implies 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗′) ≥ 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑗) for all 𝑤 ∈ ℝ. 
Note that the labor demand satisfies all assumptions made for the labor demand in Appendix D.  
The equilibrium wage, 𝑤∗(𝑗!"), is implicitly defined by 
𝑆(𝑤∗(𝑗!"), 𝑗!")− 𝐷(𝑤∗ 𝑗!" , 𝑗!") = 0.52 As both labor demand and labor supply satisfy all 
assumptions made in Appendix D, the Lemma, Corollary and Proposition 1 to 4 apply (with 
𝑗 ∈ 𝐽!"). In particular, 𝑤∗(𝑗!") is strictly positive (Lemma), so there is an immorality premium, 
and this immorality premium is increasing in the immorality of 𝑗!", 𝐼(𝑗!") (Proposition 1). The 
immoral types sort into accepting the immoral jobs, while the moral types sort into accepting the 
neutral jobs (Proposition 2). 
	
																																								 																				
52 Note that market clearance in the immoral job market implies market clearance in the neutral job market, 
1 − 𝑆 𝑤∗ 𝑗!" , 𝑗!" − 1 − 𝐷 𝑤∗ 𝑗!" , 𝑗!" = 0. 
Appendix F – Instructions  
F.1 Survey study with “clients” 
F.1.1 Option choice with recommendation 
 
 
Thank you for volunteering! 
 
Worldwide, malaria is one of the top killers of children under 5 years of age, causing the death of 
1900 children each day, mostly in developing countries.1 This is equivalent to 7 jumbo jets full of 
children disappearing, every day. However, children infected with malaria do not have to die. If they 
receive antimalarial drugs, their chances for survival are good. Donating antimalarial drugs greatly 
increases the likelihood that infected children can be saved from death. 
You can now influence the number of infected children that will receive antimalarial drugs by 
choosing one of ten options: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I or J.  
Each option influences the number of antimalarial drugs that are donated. Your choice will also 
determine your payment for participating. Your payment is always higher if you select an option that 
saves more children. 
You have no additional information about these options, except for a recommendation that is 
attached to this page. This recommendation was written by your advisor—a participant in 
another study who has been paired with you and who had full information about the 
consequences of each option. 
Please put a cross in the following table, under the option you would like to choose. The option you 
choose will be implemented. 
 
Options	
























The recommendation from your advisor is: 
  
                                                
1 Source: Dutch Malaria Foundation, a charity organization that fights malaria. 
F.1.2 Option choice without recommendation 
 
 
Thank you for volunteering! 
 
Worldwide, malaria is one of the top killers of children under 5 years of age, causing the death of 
1900 children each day, mostly in developing countries.2 This is equivalent to 7 jumbo jets full of 
children disappearing, every day. However, children infected with malaria do not have to die. If they 
receive antimalarial drugs, their chances for survival are good. Donating antimalarial drugs greatly 
increases the likelihood that infected children can be saved from death. 
You can now influence the number of infected children that will receive antimalarial drugs by 
choosing one of ten options: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I or J. 
Each option influences the number of antimalarial drugs that are donated. Your choice will also 
determine your payment for participating. Your payment is always higher if you select an option that 
saves more children. 
You have no additional information about these options.  
Please put a cross in the following table, under the option you would like to choose. The option you 
choose will be implemented. 
 
Options	
























                                                
2 Source: Dutch Malaria Foundation, a charity organization that fights malaria. 
 
 
F.1.3 Perceived industry/firm immorality 
 













Monetary intermediation (cantonal banks, 
commercial banks, stock exchange banks, private 
bankers...) 
!  !  !  !  !  
Gambling and betting activities !  !  !  !  !  
Non-life insurance (accident insurance, health 
insurance...) !  !  !  !  !  
Manufacture of tobacco products !  !  !  !  !  
Wholesale of perfume and cosmetics !  !  !  !  !  
Manufacture of paper and paperboard  !  !  !  !  !  
Wholesale of tobacco products !  !  !  !  !  
Manufacture of electronic components !  !  !  !  !  
Manufacture of weapons and ammunition  !  !  !  !  !  
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles  !  !  !  !  !  
Hotels and similar accommodation  !  !  !  !  !  
Construction of buildings  !  !  !  !  !  
General public administration activities !  !  !  !  !  
Restaurants and mobile food service activities !  !  !  !  !  
Organization and operation of sport facilities for 
indoor or outdoor sports events  !  !  !  !  !  
Credit granting  !  !  !  !  !  
Processing of tea and coffee !  !  !  !  !  
Wholesale of clothing and footwear !  !  !  !  !  
Wholesale of watches and jewellery  !  !  !  !  !  


















I don't know 
this 
organization  
Glencore !  !  !  !  !  !  
Novartis  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Roche  !  !  !  !  !  !  
ABB  !  !  !  !  !  !  
UNICEF !  !  !  !  !  !  
Adecco  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Migros  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Holcim  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Pro Juventute  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Credit Suisse  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Swisscom  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Swatch !  !  !  !  !  !  
UBS !  !  !  !  !  !  
Red Cross !  !  !  !  !  !  
Marlboro  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Monsanto Co.  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Nestlé  !  !  !  !  !  !  
WWF  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Tamoil  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Ernst & Young !  !  !  !  !  !  
Pro natura  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Winterthur 
assurance  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Syngenta  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Firmenich  !  !  !  !  !  !  
Phillip Morris 
International inc. !  !  !  !  !  !  
Swiss Life  !  !  !  !  !  !  
 
  
F.2 Laboratory experiment 






Thank you for participating. During this experiment, you will be asked to make several decisions that 
will impact the amount of money that you will earn today. Everyone who completes the experiment 
will earn 20 Swiss francs for doing so, in addition to the 10 Swiss francs you receive for 
completing the online survey. Each participant will also earn an additional amount determined by 
the decisions made in the experiment. It is thus very important that you read the instructions carefully, 
and that you make your decisions with care. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and 
wait for a staff member to come and help you.  
Communication with the other participants is strictly forbidden during the study. The use of 
your mobile phone is also forbidden. Violation of the rules will lead to exclusion from the study and 
loss of all of the associated payments.  
According to the scientific standards for lab experiments at the Decision Science Laboratory, we are 
not allowed to lie to you or deceive you at any point in time. Also note that all the information 
gathered during this experiment is stored in a strictly anonymous manner. The experimenters will not 
link your behavior to your identity. 
During the study, your income will first be calculated in points, which will be converted to Swiss 
francs at the end of the study at a rate of: 
20 points = 1 Swiss franc 
The study lasts about two and a half hours and is divided in three parts. In Part I you will make 
decisions in a choice situation. In Part II you will participate in a Market for 15 rounds. In Part III 
you will make additional decisions that are unrelated to Part II.  
You can earn money in all three parts. You will receive your total payment privately and in cash at the 
end of the experiment.  
Parts I and III are completely independent from Part II. In other words, your choices in Parts I and III 
will not influence the procedures or outcomes of Part II. 
You will now start with Part I. You find the Instructions for Part I on the next page. 
  
F.2.2 Instructions behavioral task 
 
 
Part I: Instructions 
 
 
For the first decision in Part I, some of you will be assigned the role of Participant A, and some of 
you will be assigned the role of Participant B.  
The computer will randomly assign a number, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, to each Participant A. Each number 
has the same probability to be selected. Each Participant A then has to send a message to a Participant 
B, claiming what number was assigned by the computer. Participant A may claim that the assigned 
number was either “1,” “2,” “3,” “4,” “5” or “6,” regardless of the actual number assigned. Participant 
B, who is not informed about the actual number assigned to Participant A, has to decide whether or 
not to follow the message sent by Participant A. The decision you make as Participant A is public. 
That is, every participant in today’s session will see the decision of every other participant, along with 
his or her portrait, at the very end of the experiment. 
All Participants A will first indicate what number they intend to send to Participant B for each of the 6 
numbers the computer might assign. Later, the computer will randomly select an actual assigned 
number for each Participant A and only the message corresponding to that number will be sent to 
Participant B. 
Participants’ decisions in this part will determine their resulting payments, as described below. Their 
decisions will also determine the amount of a donation to UNICEF. With the money donated, 
UNICEF will buy antimalarial drugs to save infected children who will otherwise almost certainly 
die. The box, “Malaria, UNICEF and Antimalarial Drugs” on the next page, provides information 
about malaria, UNICEF and how antimalarial drugs can save infected children.  
  
  Malaria, UNICEF and Antimalarial Drugs 
What is Malaria? 
Malaria is a disease transmitted by infected mosquitos. Their bite introduces parasites from 
the mosquito’s saliva into a person’s blood, where they mature and reproduce. The classic 
symptoms of malaria consist of bouts of fever and convulsions, chills and sweats, headaches, 
severe anemia, nausea and vomiting, leading to coma and death if left untreated.3 Worldwide, 
malaria is one of the top killers of children under 5 years of age, causing the death of 1900 
children each day, mostly in developing countries.4 This is equivalent to 7 jumbo jets full of 
children disappearing, every day. 
   
  Child suffering from Malaria in a local hospital (Source: Nationales 
Genomforschungsnetz). 
 
UNICEF and antimalarial drugs 
Children infected with malaria do not have to die. If they receive antimalarial drugs, their 
chances for survival are good. Donating antimalarial drugs greatly increases the likelihood 
that an infected child can be saved from death. The United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) is a United Nations program that provides humanitarian and developmental 
assistance to children and mothers in developing countries. UNICEF helps fight malaria by 
distributing antimalarial drugs in developing countries. 
  
The determination of payments to participants and to UNICEF is explained further below. 
First, let’s describe the decisions Participants A and B have to make in more detail: 
                                                
3 Source: Malaria Consortium, a world leading non-profit organization in the prevention, control and treatment of malaria.  
4 Source: Dutch Malaria Foundation, a charity organization that fights malaria. 
Decisions  
• For every possible number assigned by the computer, Participant A has to choose a message 
to send to Participant B, with a claim regarding what the number is. Participant A is free to 
claim any of the six possible numbers. Figure 1 illustrates how Participant A indicates which 
message to send for every possible assigned number.  
Figure 1: 
 
Depending on the actual number assigned to the pair, one message is then sent to Participant 
B. 
 
• Participant B must then decide whether or not to follow the message sent by Participant A. 






• Payment for Participant A: 
First, remember that, based on what Participant A enters on the screen shown in Figure 1 and 
the computer’s random choice of an actual assigned number, only one message is actually 
sent. Participant A receives 100 points, plus 20 times the number sent in this message. Thus, 
regardless of the actual assigned number, Participant A receives 120 points if he sends a 
message claiming that the assigned number is “1;” 140 points if he sends a message claiming 
that the assigned number is “2;” 160 points if he sends a message claiming that the assigned 
number is “3;” and so on, up to 220 points if he sends a message claiming that the assigned 
number is “6.”  
• Payment for Participant B: Participant B’s payment depends on his decision whether to 
follow Participant A’s message (and on Participant A’s message). 
o If Participant B does not follow the message from Participant A, then Participant B 
receives 30 points. 
o If Participant B follows the message from Participant A and the message is the same 
as the actual number assigned to Participant A, then Participant B receives 100 
points. 
o If Participant B follows the message from Participant A and the message is different 
from the actual number assigned to Participant A, then Participant B receives 0 
points. 
• Payment for UNICEF: We provide UNICEF with an initial amount that allows saving 5 
infected children. However, the final number of children saved may be higher or lower than 5. 
It depends on Participant B’s decision (and on Participant A’s message). 
o If Participant B does not follow the message from Participant A, then UNICEF 
receives money to buy antimalarial drugs to save 0 additional infected children. 
o If Participant B follows the message from Participant A and the message is the same 
as the actual number assigned to Participant A, then UNICEF receives money to buy 
antimalarial drugs to save 1 additional infected child. 
o If Participant B follows the message from Participant A and the message is different 
from the actual number assigned to Participant A, then the amount of money 
UNICEF receives is reduced, and 1 less infected child is saved. 
Figure 3 summarizes the consequences of the different payments that UNICEF and 
Participant B [in brackets] may receive. 
 
Figure 3. Consequences of Participant A’s and B’s decisions for donation to UNICEF [and for 
reward for Participant B] 
  Decision by Participant B is  . . . 
  . . . to follow message from Participant A 
. . . not to follow 
message from 
Participant A 
Message sent by 
Participant A . . . 
. . . equals his 
assigned number 
+1 child saved  
[Part. B: 100 points] +0 child saved 
[Part. B: 30 points] . . . is different from 
his assigned number 
-1 child saved 
[Part. B: 0 points] 
 
 
Display of your decisions and portraits: 
The choices you make as Participant A will be shown to all other participants in the experiment, 
together with your portrait. Figure 4 below shows how the other participants will see your decisions 
and your portrait. In the same manner, you will see the choices made by all other participants and 
















All subjects in the lab will make a decision as Participant A. This will be the only decision you will 
make at this point. 
At the end of the experiment, 5 subjects will be randomly selected to become Participant B. The 5 
Participants B will be randomly matched with 5 of the remaining Participants A and will make an 
additional decision regarding whether to follow or not to follow the message received from 
Participant A.  
To summarize, one of three scenarios will occur at the end of the experiment: 
• You remain Participant A and you are not matched to one of the 5 randomly selected 
Participants B: the computer will not send your message to a Participant B. 
• You remain Participant A and you are matched to one of the 5 Participants B: the computer 
will use your actual assigned number to determine which corresponding message to send to 
Participant B. 
• Your role switches from Participant A to Participant B: the computer will match you with a 
Participant A and will show you this Participant A’s message. You will then have to decide 
whether or not to follow it.  
The Participants A (whose role was not switched to Participant B) will be paid according to their 
choice, independently of whether or not they are matched to one of the 5 Participants B. The 5 
subjects who were initially Participants A and are then assigned the role of Participant B will be paid 
according to their decision as Participant B (and their matched Participant A’s message). 
Note that the 5 Participants A and the 5 Participants B who are matched at the end of the study will 
make choices that determine how many infected children actually receive an antimalarial drug from 
UNICEF. 
After the subjects in the role of Participant B have made their decisions we will tell you your 
earnings. If you had the role of Participant A, we will also tell you whether or not your message was 
sent to a Participant B. Finally, the decisions of all participants as Participant A and their respective 
portrait will be shown. Note that your decisions as Participant A will be shown to all other 
participants along with your portrait, independently of your final role. Similarly, you will see all of the 
other participants’ decisions as Participant A along with their respective portrait. 
 
Your portrait will be displayed 
here. 
Your decisions will appear here. 
Please click “OK“ on the screen once you are done reading these instructions. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. 
 
F.2.3 Market instructions 
 
 
Part II: Market Instructions 
 
 
Please do not click the OK button on the screen until the experimenter asks you to do so. 
In Part II you will participate in 15 rounds of a market activity. Through the market, each participant 
has the possibility to be hired as an Advisor in exchange for a wage. As an Advisor, you will make a 
recommendation to another participant regarding a decision. The wage for those who are hired will be 
determined by the choices of participants in the market, as described below. 
You can earn money based on the outcomes of each market round. At the end of the experiment, you 
will be paid the earnings you accumulate over the 15 rounds. 
What participants do in a market round: 
• The job of an Advisor involves writing a recommendation for a client of a firm. In each 
market round, you can be hired by firms to write up to two recommendations. Writing one 
recommendation is called one job, so you can provide up to two jobs in every round. We will 
provide more details on the jobs before starting the market. 
• At the beginning of every market round, you can state, for each job, the lowest wage at which 
you would agree to do that job. Since you can do up to two jobs, you can enter two numbers. 
We call these two numbers your wage requests. Your wage requests can differ between the 
two jobs, but the second wage request has to be at least as high as the first wage request.  
• You have a cost for each job that you provide. Specifically, performing one job means you 
incur a cost of 50 points. Performing a second job means you incur an additional cost of 110 
points. Later in the instructions, we will describe how these costs are used to determine your 
earnings in a round. 
• You can also decide not to participate in the market, meaning you are unwilling to do the job 
for any wage. In this case, your earnings will be 0 in a round. 
 
  
The following figure illustrates how to enter your wage requests on the screen: 
  
 
Before we give you more details about the job, let us explain how the market works. 
 
How the market works:  
The market consists of 6 workers (you and 5 other randomly selected participants) and 6 firms. In 
every market round, the workers submit wage requests, and firms submit wage offers. Then a market 
wage is calculated.  
The firms are automated. That is, the computer will make and submit the firms’ choices 
automatically.  
The 6 workers in your market consist of 6 participants in the experiment. For the duration of Part II, 
you will be matched with the same 5 other participants as workers in a market. Throughout the 15 
market rounds, you will see the portrait of every other worker in your market. This also means that 
other workers will see your portrait. 
Each firm needs to hire one worker to produce a recommendation for one client, and the firms 
compete for hiring workers. For each firm, there is a highest wage offer that the firm is willing to pay 
to a worker for providing a recommendation. The highest wage offer differs for each firm, but stays 
constant across the market rounds. The computer automatically makes the firms’ choices by 
submitting these highest wage offers.  
Therefore, in a market round, there will be 6 firms that automatically submit how much they are 
willing to pay for a worker and 6 workers who can each submit up to 2 wage requests in order to 
compete for being hired. Note that each firm can only hire one worker, but each worker can be hired 
by up to two firms.  
In every market round, after all workers submit their wage requests and firms submit their highest 
wage offers, a market wage is calculated. All wage requests that are lower than the market wage are 
accepted, meaning that these workers are hired. Every worker who is hired is paid the same market 
wage for each job. Since a worker can perform 0, 1 or 2 jobs, a worker can receive 0, 1 or 2 times the 
market wage. Note that if you are hired to do a job, the market wage you receive for that job will be at 
least as high as your wage request for that job.  
  
The market wage: 
We will now explain to you exactly how the computer determines the market wage:  
• The wage offers of the firms are ranked from high to low. This means that the highest wage 
offer has the 1st rank, the second highest has the 2nd rank, and so on. 
• The wage requests that you and other workers in your market submit are ranked from low to 
high. The lowest wage has the 1st rank, the second lowest has the 2nd rank, and so on. If two or 
more wage requests are equal, the computer assigns ranks randomly. Subjects that do not 
participate in the market are excluded from the ranking. 
• If the 1st (the lowest) wage request is lower than the 1st (the highest) wage offer, then the 
worker who submitted this wage request is hired to do this job. If the same is true for the 2nd 
lowest wage request and 2nd highest wage offer, then this worker is also hired, and so on. 
Let’s call the last wage offer for which this holds (that is, for which the wage offer is higher 
than the wage request of the same rank) the “market wage candidate 1” and the first wage 
request for which this does not hold anymore (that is, for which the wage request is higher 
than the wage offer of the same rank) the “market wage candidate 2.” The market wage is the 
lowest of these two market wage candidates. (If candidate 2 does not exist because every 
wage request has been accepted, candidate 1 is the market wage.) 
This procedure guarantees that: 1) all wage requests that are lower than the market wage are accepted, 
and 2) for this market wage, the amount of jobs the workers want to do and the amount of jobs the 
firms want to be done are exactly the same.  
Workers do not know the wage requests of other workers, nor do they know the firms’ wage offers. 
 
Example: 
We will now go through an example. This example is purely hypothetical. The numbers used do not 
correspond to numbers in the experiment. 
Suppose that we have a market with 4 workers, called W, X, Y and Z, and 7 firms. Note that these 
numbers are different than in the market in Part II, where there are 6 workers and 6 firms. 
In a market round, the 4 workers submit the following wage requests: 
• W does not participate in the market 
• X’s wage requests are 60 and 100 
• Y’s wage requests are 77 and 160 
• Z’s wage requests are 145 and 170 
Table 1 below summarizes the market situation and ranks the wage requests and wage offers. The 
wage requests are ranked from lowest to highest: the lowest wage request is 60, the 2nd lowest one is 
77, the 3rd lowest one is 100, the 4th lowest one is 145, the 5th lowest one is 160 and the highest one is 
170.  
Table 1 also ranks the wage offers, but from highest to lowest. Suppose that the highest wage offer 
from a firm is 120, the 2nd highest one is 115, the 3rd highest one is 105, the 4th highest one is 95, the 
5th highest one is 60, the 6th highest one is 50, and the lowest one is 40. 
 
Table 1 
Worker: X Y X Z Y Z W W 
Rank: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. - - 
Wage 
requests: 




120 115 105* 95 60 50 40 - 
 
First, let us check which jobs are done: 
• The 1st wage request is 60, which is lower than the 1st wage offer of 120. Therefore, worker X 
is hired to do his first job.  
• The 2nd wage request is 77, which is lower than the 2nd wage offer of 115. Therefore, worker 
Y is hired to do his first job.  
• The 3rd wage request is 100, which is lower than the 3rd wage offer of 105. Therefore, worker 
X is hired to do a second job.  
• The 4th wage request is 145, which is higher than the 4th wage offer of 95. Therefore, worker 
Z is NOT hired for this job. This is also true for the 5th and 6th wage requests.  
• As worker W does not participate in the market, he is not hired for a job. 
Let us now explain how the market wage is determined in this example. We have two candidate 
wages, which are shaded in Table 1:  
• Market wage candidate 1 is the last firm wage offer that is higher than the wage request with 
the same rank. That is the 3rd wage offer, 105. 
• Market wage candidate 2 is the first wage request that is higher than the wage offer with the 
same rank. That is the 4th wage request, 145. 
The market wage is the lowest of the two, that is 105 (Market wage candidate 1), indicated by a “ * ” 
in Table 1. Therefore, X is hired to do two jobs and receives 105 for each of them, Y is hired to do 
one job and receives 105, and Z and W do no jobs and receive no wage. 
 
How your earnings are computed: 
At the beginning of Part II, you will receive an initial payment of 200 points for this part. You can 
earn additional money in every market round if you are hired to do a job. 
Each job for which you are hired means you incur a cost. Let’s call the cost of the first job for which 
you are hired Cost Job1. If you are hired for a second job, this job costs you another (higher) cost, 
called Cost Job2. If you do no job (because you are not hired or you choose not to participate in the 
market), you do not incur any cost. 
In this experiment, Cost Job1 is 50 points, and Cost Job2 is 110 points. Costs are the same for all 
workers. 
Your additional earnings in a round are calculated as follows: 
1. If you are hired for 0 jobs:  
Earnings = 0 
2. If you are hired for 1 job:  
Earnings = market wage – Cost Job1 = market wage – 50 
3. If you are hired for 2 jobs:  
Earnings = 2 x market wage – Cost Job1 – Cost Job2 = 2 x market wage – 160 
 
Let us compute the earnings of workers W, X, Y and Z in the round described in our example above: 
• Suppose that Cost Job1 is 60 and Cost Job2 is 100. These are not the values that apply to you, 
but we use these hypothetical values for the example. 
• As discussed above, the market wage in this example is 105. 
• Worker X is hired to do 2 jobs. Therefore his earnings for this round are 2 x 105 – 60 – 100 = 
50. 
• Worker Y is hired to do 1 job, therefore his earnings for this round are 105 – 60 = 45. 
• Workers Z and W: Worker Z is not hired for any job and worker W does not participate in the 
market. Therefore both Z and W earn 0 in this round. 
An important rule in the market is that you may not submit wage requests below your costs. 
Otherwise, you may lose money in a round if your wage requests are accepted. Therefore, the 
computer will not allow you to submit a wage request below 50 for the first job and below 110 for the 
second job. 
 
The market rounds: 
You will play 15 market rounds. At the end of each market round, you will be informed about: 
• the total quantity of jobs that were provided in your market,  
• the market wage,  
• the history of market wages and quantities of all previous rounds,  
• the number of jobs for which you are hired,  
• the history of the number of jobs provided by every worker in every previous round. 
• your individual earnings in this round,  
• the history of the accumulated earnings of all workers up to the current round, 
• you will also see the portrait of every worker in your market.  
The outcome screen appears at the end of each trading period. On the next page you can find an 
example of an outcome screen. Please take a moment to review the outcome screen, to familiarize 
yourself with what feedback you receive at the end of a market round. Note that the reporting screen 
shows the portraits in a manner that allows all six workers in a market to connect the portraits to both 
the number of jobs provided and the accumulated earnings of every worker. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait for a staff member to come and help you.
  
Example of an outcome screen: 








Market wage and 
quantity of jobs in this 
round. 
Detailed calculation of 
your earnings in this 
round. In this example, 
you did not participate in 
the market in this round. 
The accumulated 
earnings for each worker 
in rounds 1-3.  
Your accumulated 
earnings are in blue, the 
accumulated earnings of 
other workers are in their 
assigned color.  
 





Example: Look at period 1. The turquoise, and the red workers did two jobs. You (blue), 
the green, the purple, and the orange workers each did no job. In total, this results in 4 jobs 
(as indicated by the black square). 
History of accumulated 
earnings. 
Your earnings are in blue. 
In period 1 you made no 
earnings, however, you 
started Part II with a fixed 
payment of 200 points. 
Therefore, your 
accumulated earnings are 
200 in period 1. Then in 
period 2, you earned 11  
more points, and your 
accumulated earnings 
increased to 211. In period 
3, you earned no additional 
points; therefore, your 
accumulated earnings stay 
constant at 211. 
Like you, the purple 
worker only provided one 
job in period 2. However, 
the turquoise and red 
workers did at least one job 
in each round, thereby 
increasing their 
accumulated earnings. 
The photograph of each 
worker is displayed 
above his/her assigned 
color in every round. 
F.2.4 Understanding questions market 
 
Here is an example of a trading period. Again, this example is hypothetical; the 
numbers used are not representative of the experiment. There are 6 workers (U, V, W, 
X, Y and Z). In the table below, you find the workers' wage requests and the firms' 
wage offers. They are already ordered accordingly. Costs are: 
 
Cost Job1 = 40 







1. What is the market wage? (Solution=115) 
2. How many jobs are performed in this market round? (Solution=5) 




F.2.5 Job instructions 
 
 
Part II: Job description 
 
 
Please do not click the OK button on the screen until the experimenter asks you to do so. 
As part of this experiment, UNICEF can receive money to buy and distribute antimalarial 
drugs to infected children in countries affected by malaria. Please read the box “Malaria, 
UNICEF and Antimalarial Drugs” on the next page to obtain more information about malaria, 
UNICEF and how antimalarial drugs can save infected children.   
  
  Malaria, UNICEF and Antimalarial Drugs 
What is Malaria? 
Malaria is a disease transmitted by infected mosquitos. Their bite introduces parasites from 
the mosquito’s saliva into a person’s blood, where they mature and reproduce. The classic 
symptoms of malaria consist of bouts of fever and convulsions, chills and sweats, headaches, 
severe anemia, nausea and vomiting, leading to coma and death if left untreated.1 Worldwide, 
malaria is one of the top killers of children under 5 years of age, causing the death of 1900 
children each day, mostly in developing countries.2 This is equivalent to 7 jumbo jets full of 
children disappearing, every day. 
   
  Child suffering from Malaria in a local hospital (Source: Nationales 
Genomforschungsnetz). 
 
UNICEF and antimalarial drugs 
Children infected with malaria do not have to die. If they receive antimalarial drugs, their 
chances for survival are good. Donating antimalarial drugs greatly increases the likelihood 
that an infected child can be saved from death. The United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) is a United Nations program that provides humanitarian and developmental 
assistance to children and mothers in developing countries. UNICEF helps fight malaria by 
distributing antimalarial drugs in developing countries. 
 
  
                                                
1 Source: Malaria Consortium, a world leading non-profit organization in the prevention, control and treatment of 
malaria.  
2 Source: Dutch Malaria Foundation, a charity organization that fights malaria. 
Prior to today’s session, we worked with a local organization that collects blood donations, 
the Swiss Red Cross. Individuals who donated blood as part of a donation campaign were 
given the opportunity to also generate money for UNICEF to save children infected by 
malaria. Every market in this session is matched with a group of 24 donors who each donated 
blood and thereby generated a donation to save 1 infected child. Therefore, in combination, 
these donations contributed to saving a total of 24 infected children (that is, the number of 
children who receive the antimalarial drug).  
However, you and the other workers in your market now have the possibility to influence how 
many children are actually saved. The final number of children saved may be higher or lower 
than 24 and depends partly on the decisions made by participants in Part II of this 
experiment. The impact of these decisions on the total donation is independent from the 
choice situation in Part I.  
We will now describe in detail what, exactly, the job involves. If you are hired for one job, 
you will have to advise a student who is not participating in this experiment to choose from 
several options. You may think of this student as a Client for the firm that hires you. The 
Client will be a student recruited at the University of Zurich or the ETH.  
Clients make decisions that influence their own financial reward for completing a short 
survey, as well as the size of the donation to UNICEF. Each Client must choose between 10 
options, described as “A” through “J” in Table 1. The Client’s decision will increase or 
decrease the final number of children saved as well as the Client’s own financial reward. 
However, the Client will not know the consequences associated with each option. That is, 
the Client does not observe Table 1, but only knows that he has to make a choice, from A to J, 
that can affect his financial reward and how many children receive the antimalarial drug.  
 
Table 1: Options available to the Client 









1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 0 CHF  1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 
 
Note that: 
• If the Client picks option E, the total number of children saved decreases by 1. The 
Client’s financial reward is 0 CHF. 
• If the Client picks option G (or any other option than E), 1 more child will be saved. 
The Client’s financial reward is 1 CHF. 
 
If you are hired to do the job in a round, then you are required to write the Client a 
recommendation to pick option E. Specifically, you will complete a statement, by writing 
your initials and the name of the recommended option (that is, option “E”), on a piece of 
paper that will be given to the Client. The statement will read,  
I, [your initials], have reviewed your possible choices and I recommend that you 
select the option [E]. Following my advice will save the highest number of children 
and will give you the highest financial reward.  
Your advisor: [your initials] 
 
Every other worker is hired to do exactly the same job; that is, every worker who is hired 
to do a job also has to recommend option E. 
 
The Client 
In every round, firms are randomly selected to be possibly matched with a Client. The 
probability that a firm is matched with a Client in a round is 25 percent. This probability is 
independent of whether or not the firm was able to hire a worker.  
To play the role of Clients, we will recruit students on the campus of the University of Zurich 
or the ETH. We will invite students to complete a survey and to participate in a brief choice 
experiment in which they may generate money for UNICEF to save children infected by 
malaria. The Client’s own financial reward for completing the survey also depends on his 
decision (see Table 1). For every round, if a firm is matched with a Client, that Client has to 
pick one of the ten options. Clients have no information about the options. If a Client is 
matched with a firm that hired a worker in this round, the Client will receive a 
recommendation to pick the specified option. If the firm was not able to hire a worker, the 
Client will receive no recommendation. This means that the Client will choose among the 10 
options, without knowing anything more. 
As shown in Table 1, the Client’s chosen option will determine the impact on the total 
number of children who receive the antimalarial treatment and the Client’s financial reward.  
The next two pages present the exact forms that will be shown to students recruited to 
participate as Clients. The first example corresponds to the case in which a firm hired a 
worker to provide a recommendation. The second example corresponds to the case in which a 
firm was not able to hire any worker for that specific job. 
  











• The Client has no information about the options, except for the recommendation that 
you complete by hand.  
• The Client knows that you are informed about the outcomes of the options. 
• The Client does not know that you have to recommend a specific option.  
• The Client will see your initials but will not see your portrait.  




Note that you will receive your earnings from the market in a round independently of whether 
or not any of your recommendations are distributed to Clients. That is, even if the firm for 
which you are hired is not matched with a Client, you will still receive your earnings from 
doing that job. 
 
Completing the recommendation: 
At the end of any round in which you are hired by a firm, you have to complete any 
recommendations for which you have been hired.  
You are not allowed to recommend a different option than the one specified above. You are 
also not allowed to give additional information to the Client. Also, note that you do not know 
and will not know the identity of the Client and this student will not see your portrait, he will 
only know your initials.  
Remember that you have to complete all the recommendations for which you are hired, at 
the end of every market round. For this purpose, there is a booklet, labeled Recommendation 
Booklet on your desk. At the end of each market round, if you have been hired in that round, 
you should take the booklet and complete the one or two recommendations in the section with 
the corresponding job identification number (Job ID). This number will be indicated on your 
screen at the end of every round.  
If you have not been hired for any jobs, or if you decided not to participate in the market, 
please cross “I was not hired/did not participate” next to the corresponding job identification 
number. 











At the end of the experiment, we will check that you have carefully completed all the 
recommendations for the rounds in which you were hired. If a recommendation is illegible, is 
wrong (e.g., you recommend a different option), is incomplete or gives additional information 
to the Client, we will ask you to write it again. If you refuse to complete all 
recommendation(s) for which you were hired, you will not receive any payment for this 
experiment (you will not even receive your participation fee). Note that you will always 
have the option not to accept any jobs in a round and thereby not have to write any 
recommendations. 
If a firm is not matched with a Client in a round, then any recommendation you produced for 
this firm will be returned to you at the end of today’s session and will therefore not be used.  
To summarize, Table 2 presents four cases that may arise, based on whether a firm is 








If you have not 
been hired or if 
you decided not 
to participate in 
the market, mark 
an “X” here. 
Once completed, 
sign the  
recommendation, 
by again writing 
your initials. 
 
If you have been 
hired, complete 
the text with your 
initials and the 
name of the option 
(i.e. option E). 
 
Table 2 
 Firm F was able to hire worker X 
Firm F was not able to hire 
any worker 
Firm F is drawn to be 
matched with a Client 
The matched Client receives 
a recommendation to choose 
E, completed by worker X. 
The matched Client receives 
no recommendation. 
Firm F is not drawn to be 
matched with a Client 
Firm F is not matched with 
any Client. 
Worker X’s recommendation 
is not used and is returned to 
Worker X. 
Firm F is not matched with 
any Client. 
 
At the end of the experiment, we will tell you which of your recommendations will be given 
to a Client and which will not be used and will be returned to you. Again, note that you will 
receive your earnings independently of whether or not any of your recommendations are 
distributed to Clients. 
Remember that according to the scientific standards at the Decision Science Laboratory, we 
are not allowed to lie to you at any point in time. We will actually hire Clients and give them 
the recommendations completed in this experiment, and they will make the choices described 
above. These choices will then determine the number of infected children who receive the 
anti-malaria drugs through donations to UNICEF. Remember: children who do not receive 
anti-malarial drugs are very likely to die. At the end of the study, we can provide you with a 
receipt documenting the final amount donated to UNICEF. If you would like to obtain a copy, 
please write an email to decision-study@econ.uzh.ch with "Receipt - UNICEF” as the header. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
  
F.2.6 Recommendation booklet 
 
Recommendation Booklet 
Note: Please only complete a recommendation if you are instructed to do so by the computer. 
 




The following statement was generated in an 
experiment that raises donations for UNICEF.  
Your advisor recommends you the following: 
I, ………… , have reviewed your possible 
choices and I recommend that you select 
the option ……… . Following my advice will 
save the highest number of children and 
will give you the highest financial reward. 




£ I was not hired/did not participate 
The following statement was generated in an 
experiment that raises donations for UNICEF.  
Your advisor recommends you the following: 
I, ………… , have reviewed your possible 
choices and I recommend that you select 
the option ……… . Following my advice will 
save the highest number of children and 
will give you the highest financial reward. 




£ I was not hired/did not participate 
                
F.2.7 Understanding questions market 
 






2. Suppose you write a recommendation for a firm that is not matched to a Client in 
the round. 
 
i) What will happen with your recommendation?  
o You can keep it 
o We will keep it 
o We will give it to another Client 
(Solution=You can keep it) 
 
ii) What are your earnings from this job?  
o You receive no earnings as your recommendation is unused 
o You receive the market wage in this round 
(Solution=You receive the market wage in this round) 
 
3. Suppose that in a round, a firm is matched with a Client but the firm was not able to 
hire a worker in that round. What happens to the matched Client?  
o He receives a recommendation from another firm 
o He receives no recommendation at all 
(Solution=He receives no recommendation at all) 
 
4. Suppose that a Client received a recommendation from you. Check every piece of 
information he has when he chooses between the options. The Client knows: 
 
 (Solution=your recommendation and your initials) 
  
F.2.8 Survey end of experiment 
 
After subjects participated in the market, but before they learn about their final 
earnings, they answer the following questions: 
 





















3. If you stayed out of the market for at least one market round, what was your 
specific reason for doing so? 
 
4. If you participated in the market for at least one market round, what was your 
specific reason for doing so? 
 
  
5. If you participated in the market, indicate how much the following reasons 
influenced your behavior? 
 
a) I did not like accepting the job, but wanted to earn money. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
b) I don't mind lying to Clients. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
c) It is efficient to lie, as the Clients lose less than I gain. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
d) The probability that a Client receives my recommendation was low. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
e) I did not like that dishonest people received high wages by accepting jobs, and 
therefore wanted to catch up. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
f) I did not like that dishonest people received high wages by accepting jobs. I 
accepted the job to lower the wage received by these dishonest people. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
g) If I don't do the job, somebody else will do it. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
h) As many participants accepted the job, it is ok to do it as well. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
i) In a market, there is no reason to behave nicely. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
j) I do not care for UNICEF or for the infected children. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
k) I just give advice, it is the Client's responsibility to implement the best option. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
l) The Client will not follow my recommendation anyway. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
m) I'm not concerned about what other people think of me. 
did not at all affect my behavior o o o o o greatly affected my behavior 
 
  
6. For each of the statements, indicate how much each statement is like you by using 
the following scale: a lot like me, somewhat like me, a little like me and not like me at 
all. 
 
Please be as honest as you can throughout, and try not to let your responses to one 
question influence your response to other questions. There are no right or wrong 
answers. 
 
a) I’m concerned about my style of doing things. 
o a lot like me 
o somewhat like me 
o a little like me 
o not like me at all 
 
b) I care a lot about how I present myself to others. 
o a lot like me 
o somewhat like me 
o a little like me 
o not like me at all 
 
c) I’m self-conscious about the way I look. 
o a lot like me 
o somewhat like me 
o a little like me 
o not like me at all 
 
d) I usually worry about making a good impression. 
o a lot like me 
o somewhat like me 
o a little like me 
o not like me at all 
 
e) Before I leave my house, I check how I look. 
o a lot like me 
o somewhat like me 
o a little like me 
o not like me at all 
 
f) I’m concerned about what other people think of me. 
o a lot like me 
o somewhat like me 
o a little like me 
o not like me at all 
 
g) I’m usually aware of my appearance 
o a lot like me 
o somewhat like me 
o a little like me 
o not like me at all  




Thank you for your participation in our experiment. 
 
Our experiment consists of two parts: an online survey that you are about to complete, 
and a subsequent session in the laboratory. For participating in the online survey, you 
will receive CHF 10. You will receive this payment in cash at the end of the 
laboratory study. 
 
The online survey will last about 25 min. There are no right or wrong answers, and 
we ask you to answer truthfully and with care. All the information gathered in this 
experiment is kept strictly anonymous. 
 
In order to participate in this experiment you are required to complete the online 
survey at least 4 days before the lab session starts. If you do not complete it in time 
you will not be allowed to participate in the lab session and will receive no payment. 
 
Please choose a silent environment in order to remain focused and to avoid being 
interrupted while answering. Your answers will be saved by mean of a cookie that is 
placed on your computer. Make sure that your computer does not block it, or 
complete the survey in one sitting. Also, it is important that you complete the entire 
survey using the same computer and the same web browser. 
 
Once you are ready, please click Next on the bottom right of this page to access the 
next screen. 
 
F.3.2 Demographics  
 
How old are you? 
 




What is your highest educational attainment? 
o High school 
o Bachelor degree 
o Master degree 
o PhD degree 
o Other 
 
At which of the following institutions have you completed most of your studies until 
now? 
o University 
o ETHZ or EPFL 
o University for Applied Sciences 
o Other 
What is(are) your field(s) of study? 
Major:……………………………… 
Minor (if any):……………………… 
 
Please, indicate all your nationalities 
………………………………………………………………………… 
 
What do you think will be your first full-time job after your studies? Please indicate 
only one job. 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
How much do you think you will earn when you are 40 years old? Indicate your 





F.3.3 Willingness to work in industries 
 
How willing would you be to work in each of the following industry in Switzerland?  
 









(cantonal banks, commercial 
banks, stock exchange 
banks, private bankers...) 
o o o o o 
Gambling and betting 
activities 
o o o o o 
Non-life insurance (accident 
insurance, health 
insurance...) 
o o o o o 
Manufacture of tobacco 
products 
o o o o o 
Wholesale of perfume and 
cosmetics 
o o o o o 
Manufacture of paper and 
paperboard 
o o o o o 
Wholesale of tobacco 
products 
o o o o o 
Manufacture of electronic 
components 
o o o o o 
Manufacture of weapons 
and ammunition 
o o o o o 
Maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles 
o o o o o 
Hotels and similar 
accommodation 
o o o o o 




o o o o o 
Restaurants and mobile food 
service activities 
o o o o o 
Organization and operation 
of sport facilities for indoor 
or outdoor sports events 
o o o o o 
Credit granting o o o o o 
Processing of tea and coffee o o o o o 
Wholesale of clothing and 
footwear 
o o o o o 
Wholesale of watches and 
jewelery 
o o o o o 
Fitness facilities o o o o o 
 
F.3.4 Willingness to work in firms 
 
How willing would you be to work for one of the following organization? 
 







I don't know 
this 
organization 
Glencore  o o o o o o 
Novartis  o o o o o o 
Roche  o o o o o o 
ABB  o o o o o o 
UNICEF  o o o o o o 
Adecco  o o o o o o 
Migros  o o o o o o 
Holcim  o o o o o o 
Pro Juventute  o o o o o o 
Credit Suisse  o o o o o o 
Swisscom  o o o o o o 
Swatch  o o o o o o 
UBS  o o o o o o 
Red Cross  o o o o o o 
Marlboro  o o o o o o 
Monsanto Co.  o o o o o o 
Nestlé  o o o o o o 
WWF  o o o o o o 
Tamoil  o o o o o o 
Ernst & Young  o o o o o o 
Pro natura  o o o o o o 
Winterthur 
assurance  
o o o o o o 
Syngenta  o o o o o o 
Firmenich  o o o o o o 
Phillip Morris 
International inc. 
o o o o o o 
Swiss Life o o o o o o 
 
F.3.5 Charity attitude index 
 
Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements about charities. 
 




Agree Strongly agree 
People should be willing to 
help others who are less 
fortunate. 
o o o o o 
Helping troubled people 
with their problems is very 
important to me. 
o o o o o 
People should be more 
charitable toward others in 
society. 
o o o o o 
People in need should 
receive support from others. 
o o o o o 
The money given to 
charities goes for good 
causes. 
o o o o o 
Much of the money donated 
to charity is wasted. 
o o o o o 
My image of charitable 
organizations is positive. 
o o o o o 
Charitable organizations 
have been quite successful 
in helping the needy. 
o o o o o 
Charity organizations 
perform a useful function 
for society. 





Here is a series of 10 statements that might apply to you. Please read each statement and 
decide how much you agree or disagree with that statement. Then pick the element of the 
following scale that best represents your position: 
 
Please answer every statement, even if you are not completely sure of your response. 
 




Agree Strongly agree 
I wouldn't use flattery to get 
a raise or promotion at 
work, even if I thought it 
would succeed. 
o o o o o 
If I want something from 
someone, I will laugh at that 
person's worst jokes. 
o o o o o 
I wouldn't pretend to like 
someone just to get that 
person to do favors for me. 
o o o o o 
If I knew that Icould never 
get caught, I would be 
willing to steal a million 
dollars. 
o o o o o 
I would never accept a 
bribe, even if it were very 
large. 
o o o o o 
I'd be tempted to use 
counterfeit money, if I were 
sure I could get away with 
it. 
o o o o o 
Having a lot of money is not 
especially important to me. 
o o o o o 
I would get a lot of pleasure 
from owning expensive 
luxury goods. 
o o o o o 
I think that I am entitled to 
more respect than the 
average person is. 
o o o o o 
I want people to know that I 
am an important person of 
high status. 




F.3.7 Protected Value 1 
 
The next two questions are about financial advisers. Because financial advisers may have 
larger margins on bad assets, they have an incentive to recommend sub-optimal assets to their 
clients. What is your opinion on advisers who recommend these bad assets in order to make 
more profits? 
 
Please select a number for each category. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Very 
immoral 
o o o o o o o Very moral 
Not at all 
praiseworthy 
o o o o o o o Very 
praiseworthy 
Not at all 
blameworthy 
o o o o o o o Very 
blameworthy 
Not at all 
outrageous 
o o o o o o o Very 
outrageous 
Not at all 
acceptable 
o o o o o o o Very 
acceptable 
 
F.3.8 Protected Value 2 
 
Financial advisers have the opportunity to recommend suboptimal assets to their clients. 
Some view such a behavior as a violation of truthfulness, others regard it as acceptable 
protection of personal interests. What do you think about the value of truthfulness in such a 
situation? Truthfulness is something... 
 
Please select the appropriate category 
 




Agree Strongly agree 
… that one should not 
sacrifice, no matter what the 
(material or other) benefits. 
o o o o o 
… for which I think it is 
right to make a cost-benefit 
analysis. 
o o o o o 
…that cannot be measured 
in monetary terms. 
o o o o o 
… about which I can be 
flexible if the situation 
demands it. 
o o o o o 
 
  
F.3.9 Integrity and Work Ethics Test 1 
 





Tom and Tina are discussing whether or not they think that most people are fundamentally 
honest. 
 
Tom: The majority of people out there in this world are basically honest. They know the 
difference between right and wrong, and they act accordingly. 
Tina: I think that when faced with an enticing situation where they are not likely to be caught 
doing something wrong, most people will succumb the temptation. 
Tom: I think your view of the world is too cynical - you don't have enough faith in the 
people! 
Tina: Well, I think you are naive! 
 
o I agree almost entirely with Tom. 
o I agree with Tom, but I think Tina makes some good points. 
o I agree equally with Tina and Tom. 
o I agree with Tina, but I think Tom makes some good points. 
o I agree almost entirely with Tina. 
 




Bob and Betsy are debating whether using a sick day for reasons other than illness is wrong. 
 
Bob: The other day the weather was so nice, I couldn't stand the thought of going to work. I 
didn't think I could handle another minute of the daily grind without some kind of break. So I  
called in sick. 
Betsy: Really? Personally, I think that was dishonest of you. Your boss should be able to 
count on you - you should be at work unless you are too sick to come in. 
Bob: I get five sick days a year, and I rarely use them. It makes no difference for my 
employer whether I'm really sick or just need to slow down! 
 
o I agree almost entirely with Bob. 
o I agree with Bob, but I think Betsy makes some good points. 
o I agree equally with Bob and Betsy. 
o I agree with Betsy, but I think Bob makes some good points. 
o I agree almost entirely with Betsy. 
 
F.3.11 Support non-profit organizations 
 
Do you agree with the statement that the following non-profit organizations are worth 
supporting? 
 




Agree Strongly agree 
I don't know 
this 
organization 
Red cross o o o o o o 
Pro juventute o o o o o o 
World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF) 
o o o o o o 
Pro natura o o o o o o 
UNICEF  o o o o o o 
 
F.3.12 Big Five 
 
Here is a series of 10 statements that might apply to you. Please read each statement and 
decide how much you agree or disagree with that statement. Then pick the element of the 
following scale that best represents your position: 
 
Please answer every statement, even if you are not completely sure of your response. 
 

















o o o o o o o 
Critical, 
quarrelsome. 




o o o o o o o 
Anxious, 
easily upset. 
o o o o o o o 
Open to new 
experiences, 
complex. 
o o o o o o o 
Reserved, 
quiet. 
o o o o o o o 
Sympathetic, 
warm. 
o o o o o o o 
Disorganized, 
careless. 




o o o o o o o 
Conventional, 
uncreative. 
o o o o o o o 
 
 
F.3.13 Identification code 
 
In order to anonymously link your answers from this survey to your answers in the lab 
experiment that you will attend in the near future, we need you to generate a personal 
identification code. To do so, please, follow the instructions below. 
 
To generate your identification code, you will have to enter the corresponding character for 
each of the following categories in each field below. Please, use only lower case letters. 
 
1) The first letter of your father's first name* 
2) The last letter of your father's first name* 
3) The first letter of your mother's first name* 
4) The last letter of your mother's first name* 
5) The first digit of your current home address's street number 
 
* First name means Prénom in French, Vorname in German and Nombre in Spanish. 
 
During the lab experiment, you will be asked those 5 questions again, as a way of 
anonymously matching your responses across the two sessions. Since you will see the 
questions again, you do not need to remember your identification code as long as you recall 
the answers. If you would like, you may take a picture of this screen with your mobile 
phone once you have entered the 5 characters. It is important that you are able to 
reproduce your identification code in the lab. 
 
If you cannot reproduce your identification code in the lab, you will not be paid the 10 CHF 
for completing this survey. 
 
Example: if your father is called Simon Müller, and your mother is called Lisa Müller, and if 
you live at Blümlisalpstrasse 29, then, you will write: 
 
s in the first field 
n in the second field 
l in the third field 
a in the fourth field 
2 in the fifth field 
 
The first letter of your father's first name*: ……….. 
The last letter of your father's first name*: ……….. 
The first letter of your mother's first name*: ……….. 
The last letter of your mother's first name*: ……….. 
The first digit of your current home address's number: ……….. 
